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INTRODUCTION 
Americans rightly regard The Fourteenth Amendment as the jewel of 
our Constitution. But why exactly is it legitimate? In recent years, Bruce 
Ackerman has reawakened the legal academy to the issues of Fourteenth 
Amendment legitimacy after a long dogmatic slumber, proposing a novel 
theory to answer the two chief concerns regarding Fourteenth Amendment 
legitimacy.1 The Amendment’s legitimacy faces two challenges: (1) 
Congress’s tainted proposal of the Amendment in 1866 while excluding 
Southern representatives long after Confederate armies surrendered and 
President Andrew Johnson installed new Southern governments; and (2) 
tainted Southern ratifications that Congress coerced in 1867 through 
militarily imposed black suffrage and required as the price of readmission 
to Congress. After Congress fervently debated these problems early in 
Reconstruction,2 such discussion largely died down after 1872—when the 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN. 
 * Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and 
Philosophy, University of Mississippi School of Law. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, 
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 1. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 
93 YALE L.J. 1017 (1984); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–252 
(1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]. 
 2. The 1868 Democratic Party platform called the Reconstruction Acts, 
which required Fourteenth Amendment ratifications as the price of readmission 
to Article I rights, “unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void.” See Gerhard Peters 
& John Woolley, Political Party Platforms: 1868 Democratic Party Platform, 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29579 
[https://perma.cc/Z7MK-7FSE]. Francis Blair, Jr., the vice-presidential candidate 
in 1868, called the Reconstruction Amendments “fraudulent amendments” as late 
as 1871. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 134 (1871). For more on the 
congressional debate over legitimacy in 1871, see Christopher R. Green, The 
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Democratic Party platform treated the issue as settled3—with only a small 
flare-up during the Civil Rights movement.4 Since Ackerman started work 
on the legitimacy issue in 1984, however, the issue has received significant 
scholarly treatments from John Harrison,5 Akhil Amar,6 and most recently, 
Tom Colby.7 
Does the Fourteenth Amendment lack basic legitimacy under Article 
V? If so, its legitimacy in contemporary American legal culture is 
problematic. Clarifying the exact nature of the Amendment’s legitimacy 
                                                                                                             
Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and 
Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219, 229 n.28 (2009). 
 3. The 1872 Democratic platform stated, “We pledge ourselves to maintain 
the union of these States, emancipation and enfranchisement; and to oppose any 
reopening of the questions settled by the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments of the Constitution.” Gerhard Peters & John Woolley, Political Party 
Platforms: 1872 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=%2029580 [https://perma.cc/8ZAL-P 
C3P].  
 4. See Walter J. Suthon, The Dubious Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
28 TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953); Joint Resolution of Georgia General Assembly, Mar. 
8, 1957, available at http://goo.gl/XnURIj [https://perma.cc/6GCN-7EWW]; 
David Lawrence, There is No “Fourteenth Amendment”!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Sept. 27, 1957, at 140, available at http://www.constitution.org/14ll 
/no14th.htm [https://perma.cc/TJ99-QSLT]; Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Threat That It Poses 
to Our Democratic Government, 11 S.C.L.Q. 484 (1959); Joseph L. Call, The 
Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical Background, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 
(1961); Ferdinand F. Fernandez, The Constitutionality of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 378 (1966); Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 269–74 
(Utah 1968). A later addition to the literature was Forrest McDonald, Was the 
Fourteenth Amendment Constitutionally Adopted?, 1 GA. J. SOUTHERN LEGAL 
HIST. 1 (1991). 
 5. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001). 
 6. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 364–80 
(2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]; AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 79–88 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]; Akhil Amar, Lindsey Ohlsson Worth & 
Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Reconstructing the Republic: The Great Transition of 
the 1860s, in TRANSITIONS (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) [hereinafter Amar et al., 
Reconstructing the Republic); Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5 — 
and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 109 (2013) [hereinafter Amar, 
Section 5]. 
 7. Thomas Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627 (2013). 
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has significant practical importance. If the Fourteenth Amendment is akin 
to an improperly issued check, concern that the Amendment has “come 
back marked ‘insufficient funds,’” as Martin Luther King, Jr. said of 
constitutional guarantees, is less justified.8 Different theories of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s legitimacy also affect theories of the 
Amendment’s exact content, as well as the legitimacy of other parts of our 
constitutional culture. Who issued the Fourteenth Amendment check, and 
on what bank account, matters. 
This Article and its companion9 defend a view that aims to fit the text and 
history of the Constitution, preserve Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy in a 
simple, appealing fashion, and clarify the Fourteenth Amendment’s author by 
framing the Fourteenth Amendment as an expression of the victorious 
Union’s Republican principles. The Fourteenth Amendment was a Northern-
authored check on the bank of the Union that the South tried to invalidate. 
I call the view “loyal denominatorism.” The disloyal South was not 
entitled to resume its Article I and Article V powers—including the 
“denominator power,” i.e., the right to be counted among the total of which 
three-fourths of the states’ ratifications were required, and so to be counted 
as voting “no” prior to ratifying—until Congress was satisfied with 
reestablished Southern loyalty. Accordingly, unrepresented former 
Confederates should be excluded from the denominator of Article V’s 
“three fourths of the several States”10 ratio.11 Only states deemed 
sufficiently loyal to be represented in Congress—i.e., included in “the 
                                                                                                             
 8. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Aug. 28, 1963, available at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm [https://perma.cc 
/ZCL5-M9BW] (“In a sense we’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. 
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which 
every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black 
men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the ‘unalienable Rights’ of ‘Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’ It is obvious today that America has defaulted 
on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of 
honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, 
a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds.’”). 
 9. Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 167 (2017). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 11. Akhil Amar briefly flirted with this view, saying that Congress could have 
adopted the view, but the history in both 1867 and 1868 reject such a path. See 
infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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several States” and “each State” referenced in Article I12—are included in 
“the several States” in Article V. The Fourteenth Amendment thus became 
part of the Constitution on February 12, 1867 when Pennsylvania became 
the 20th state to ratify, and more than three-fourths of the 26 states were 
represented in Congress.13 Loyal denominatorism, therefore, conflicts with 
one of the only non-controversial facts about the Amendment—its 
adoption in July 1868, when 28 of the total 37 states of the Union had 
ratified. Similarly, loyal denominatorism moves the date of adoption of 
the Thirteenth Amendment from December 6, 1865 to June 30, 1865.  
Another change, more interpretively significant than these slight 
changes in the exact dates of adoption, is of the traditionally understood 
constitutional author. Loyal denominatorism presents the states of the 
North as acting alone in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
therefore, loyal denominatorism suggests that the North alone uttered its 
text. That is, Northern concepts of equality, due process, and the privileges 
of citizens, rather than versions of these concepts Republicans and former 
Confederates jointly expressed, are the concepts the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s language articulates. 
Although this Article focuses on the history of loyal denominatorism 
during Reconstruction, its companion14 defends the propriety of reading 
“state” as tacitly meaning “reliably loyal state” in Articles I, II, and V 
under traditional and contemporary philosophy of language and 
linguistics, the history of the law of war, and the separation of war powers 
between Congress and the President. 
Part I of this Article explains the loyal-denominator view of Article V 
legitimacy in contrast to other contemporary views and in the context of 
the basic history of Reconstruction. Part II delves into the history of loyal 
denominatorism, first explaining how reading “state” as “reliably loyal 
state” could textually make sense, and then rehearsing arguments for the 
loyal denominator, organized both chronologically and then by source. An 
appendix sets out expressions of the loyal denominator in context. 
                                                                                                             
 12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“the People of the several States” entitled 
to representation in Congress); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“[E]ach State shall have at 
Least one Representative . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (Senate composed of “two 
Senators from each State”); see also id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 13. See infra note 20. 
 14. See Green, supra note 9. 
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I. AN EXPOSITION OF LOYAL DENOMINATORISM 
A loyal denominator tells a new story of how America’s constitutional 
scheme functioned during Reconstruction. The traditional story of 
ratification is that the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the 
Constitution only after Southern states ratified the amendment in 1868 in 
exchange for the right to be represented in Congress. Three different ways 
to see a loyal denominator in light of Reconstruction exist: (1) as a theory 
supporting Thirteenth Amendment legitimacy; (2) as a way to establish 
parity between states’ power to say “yes” and their power to say “no”; and 
(3) as a theory explaining the Reconstruction Act of 1867. 
A. The Traditional Account and a Timeline 
The traditional account of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
includes Southern ratifications. Congress proposed the Thirteenth 
Amendment in January 1865, receiving the ratifications of 19 loyal states and 
8 former Confederate states by December 1865, for a total of 27 of the 36 
states in the entire Union.15 Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 
June 1866, receiving the ratifications of 20 Northern and 8 former 
Confederate states by July 1868, for a total of 28 of the 37 states in the whole 
Union, including Nebraska, which joined the Union on March 1, 1867. 
The loyal-denominator view asserts that the traditional story of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has an 8-states-too-high numerator and an 11-
states-too-high denominator, preferring 20 of 26 states in February 1867 
to 28 of 37 states in July 1868. For the Thirteenth Amendment, loyal 
denominatorism excludes Tennessee from the denominator, preferring 19 
of 25 states in June 1865 to 27 of 36 states in December 1865. 
Four key events exist in this timeline: 
(1) the Southern states’ 1865 ratifications of the Thirteenth 
Amendment;16 
(2) the exclusion of Southern representatives from 1865 to 1868; 17 
(3) the 1867 imposition of black suffrage, military rule, and a 
demand for ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
                                                                                                             
 15. See infra note 20. 
 16. See infra note 20. 
 17. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1865) (no Senators from 
former Confederacy); id. at 3 (no representatives from former Confederacy, over 
protest from Horace Maynard of Tennessee); for readmissions, see, e.g., CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4320 (1868) (Frederick Sawyer from South 
Carolina seated as Senator). 
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South;18 and 
(4) the Southern states’ 1868 ratifications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.19 
The puzzle of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy is 
simple. Because only 25 states stayed loyal to the Union, a full Article V 
denominator requires ratifications from the South, either for the Thirteenth 
or Fourteenth Amendments, i.e., both (1) and (4) in the above timeline. A 
legitimate proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress also 
requires the legitimacy of (2), the congressional exclusion that made it 
possible. The legitimacy of (4) requires the legitimacy of (3); Southern 
ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment rested on procedures the 
Reconstruction Act imposed. The legitimacy of both (2) and (3), however, 
is in tension with the legitimacy of (1); if the Southern states validly 
ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, it was proper neither to 
exclude them in 1866 from Congress or for the Reconstruction Act of 1867 
to deny their legitimacy. “Legal governments,” which (3) denied, are 
required for the Article V powers exercised in (1). The representative-
selecting powers denied in (2) entail the amendment-ratifying powers 
affirmed in (1). A Southern-ratification-based Fourteenth Amendment is 
thus in tension with a Southern-ratification-based Thirteenth Amendment. 
Loyal denominatorism resolves the tension by dispensing with both 
ratification requirements. 
A chart of Northern and Southern ratifications of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments as well as congressional events follows: 
 
                                                                                                             
 18. See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel 
States, 14 Stat. 428 (Mar. 2, 1867). 
 19. See infra note 20. 
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Date 
 
North: 
13A yes:  
13A yes 
 
North: 
13A no:  
 
South: 
13A yes 
South: 
13A no Congress 
4/8/1864     Senate passes 13A 
1/31/1865     House passes 13A 
2/1865 
IL, RI, MI, 
MD, NY, 
PA, WV, 
MO, ME, 
KS, MA, 
OH, IN, 
NV, MN, 
WI 
DE, KY VA, LA   
3/1865 VT NJ    
4/1865   TN, AR   
5/1865 CT     
6/1865 NH (19/25 loyal) 
    
11/1865   SC   
12/1865 OR, CA 
 
AL, NC, 
GA (27/36 
total), FL 
MS 
Congress excludes 
Southern reps; 
Seward declares 
13A ratified with 
South in numerator 
& denominator 
1/1866 IA, NJ     
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Date 
No  
North: 
14A yes:  
4A yes 
North: 
 North: 
14A no:  
 
4A no 
South:  
South: 
14A yes 
14Ayes 
South::
14A no Congress 
6/1866 CT    14A proposed 
7/1866 NH  TN  TN reps readmitted  
9/1866 NJ, OR     
10/1866 VT   TX  
11/1866    GA  
12/1866    FL, NC, AR, SC  
1/1867 
NY, OH, 
IL, WV, 
MI, KS, 
MN, ME, 
NV, IN, 
MO 
KY  VA  
2/1867 
RI, WI, 
PA (20/26 
rep’d) 
DE  LA  
3/1867 MA MD   NE into Union; Reconstruction Act 
6/1867 NE     
1/1868  OH  MS  
2/1868  NJ    
3/1868 IA     
4/1868   AR   
6/1868   FL  AR & FL readmitted  
7/1868  
 
NC, SC, 
LA, AL, 
GA (28/37 
total, 30/37 
if OH-NJ) 
 
NC, SC, LA, AL reps 
readmitted; GA reps 
readmitted but excluded 
after GA excludes black 
reps); Seward & 
Congress declare 14A 
ratified, but treat 
Southern ratifications 
ambiguously  
10/1868  OR    
10/1869   VA   
1/1870   MS  VA reps readmitted 
2/1870   TX (&13A)  MS, TX reps readmitted 
7/1870     GA reps readmitted 
 
Exact dates and other details are left for a footnote.20  
                                                                                                             
 20. Ratification dates for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are set 
out in The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and 
Interpretation, CONG. RES. SERV., 30 n.5, 31 n.6 (2002). The Congressional 
Research Service (“CRS”) lists these dates for Thirteenth Amendment loyal 
ratifications: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2, 1865; 
Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February 3, 1865; New York, February 
3, 1865; West Virginia, February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine, 
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February 7, 1865; Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7, 1865; 
Pennsylvania, February 8, 1865; Ohio, February 10, 1865; Indiana, February 16, 
1865; Nevada, February 16, 1865; Minnesota, February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, 
February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New 
Hampshire, June 30, 1865; Oregon, December 11, 1865; California, December 
15, 1865; Iowa, January 17, 1866; and New Jersey, January 23, 1866. 
  Nine former-Confederate ratifications occurred during the same period: 
Virginia, February 9, 1865; Louisiana, February 15–16, 1865; Tennessee, April 
7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14, 1865; South Carolina, November 13, 1865; Alabama, 
December 2, 1865; North Carolina, December 4, 1865; Georgia, December 6, 
1865; Florida, December 28, 1865. Id. On the full-denominator story, 8 of these 
states plus the 19 loyal-state ratifications received by June 1865, means the 
Thirteenth Amendment became law on December 6, 1865. Delaware rejected the 
Fourteenth Amendment on February 8, 1865; Kentucky on February 24, 1865; 
New Jersey on March 16, 1865 (prior to its acceptance the next year); and 
Mississippi on December 2, 1865. Id.  
  For the Fourteenth Amendment, the CRS lists the following dates for the 
loyal states (including Tennessee): Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire, 
July 7, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866; Oregon, 
September 19, 1866; Vermont, October 30, 1866; New York, January 10, 1867; 
Ohio, January 11, 1867; Illinois, January 15, 1867; West Virginia, January 16, 
1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Minnesota, January 
17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January 22, 1867; Indiana, January 
23, 1867; Missouri, January 26, 1867; Rhode Island, February 7, 1867; 
Wisconsin, February 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, February 12, 1867; Massachusetts, 
March 20, 1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; and Iowa, March 9, 1868. This list 
totals 23 loyal ratifications, but Ohio attempted to rescind ratification on January 
15, 1868, New Jersey on February 20, 1868, and Oregon on October 15, 1868. Id.  
  Between the fall of 1866 and early 1868, three loyal border states and 
nine former Confederate states rejected the Fourteenth Amendment: Texas, 
October 27, 1866; Georgia, November 9, 1866; Florida, December 6, 1866; North 
Carolina, December 13, 1866; Arkansas, December 17, 1866; South Carolina, 
December 20, 1866; Kentucky, January 8, 1867; Virginia, January 9, 1867; 
Louisiana, February 6, 1867; Delaware, February 7, 1867; Maryland, March 23, 
1867; and Mississippi, January 31, 1868. Id. 
  Seven former Confederate states ratified later in 1868, pressured by the 
Reconstruction Act: Arkansas, April 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; North 
Carolina, July 2, 1868; South Carolina, July 8, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868; 
Alabama, July 13, 1868; and Georgia, July 21, 1868. Id. Finally, the government 
demanded three ratifications of former Confederate states even after three-fourths 
of the full denominator was reached: Virginia, October 8, 1869; Mississippi, 
January 17, 1870; and Texas, February 18, 1870. Id. 
  Slight disagreements on dates affect the exact dates on which the 
amendments became law under the loyal-denominator view. See, e.g., Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org 
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B. Thirteenth Amendment Legitimacy Requires a Loyal Denominator  
Citizens widely understood Congress’s actions in refusing to seat 
Southern representatives and in continuing to brand Southern states as 
“rebel states” in 1867 lacking “legal state governments”21 to conflict with 
the validity of Southern Thirteenth Amendment ratifications of 1865. The 
Southern legislatures that ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 were 
the same groups that Congress later deemed unable to elect Senators or 
supervise the election of Representatives. If those selections of representatives 
were void, so were the ratifications. Indeed, Southern ratifications—which 
President Johnson and Secretary of State William Seward trumpeted—were 
the chief rationale for seating these states’ representatives. In January 1866, 
the New York Herald made the argument in its pithiest form: “If a State 
Legislature is valid to ratify the amendment, it is valid for the election of its 
United States Senators. We cannot make it flesh in the one case and fish in 
the other.”22 The dissenters on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction—
Senator Reverdy Johnson and Representatives A.J. Rogers and Henry 
Grider—claimed the South was entitled to its Article I rights and relied on the 
states’ presumed participation in the Article V process: “To consult a State 
not in the Union on the propriety of adopting a constitutional amendment to 
the government of the Union, and which is necessary to affect those States 
only composing the Union, would be an absurdity.”23 Commentators 
                                                                                                             
/wiki/Thirteenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution [https://perma 
.cc/LZR8-MWT7] (listing New Hampshire’s Thirteenth-Amendment ratification as 
July 1, rather than the CRS’s June 30); William H. Seward, Proclamation of July 
28, 1868, 15 Stat. 708, 710 (listing Pennsylvania’s Fourteenth Amendment 
ratification as February 13, not CRS’s February 12). 
  New Jersey and Ohio attempted to rescind their ratifications in early 1868, 
but it was not clear whether they succeeded. On the full-denominator view, whether 
ratifications can be rescinded affects only the Fourteenth Amendment’s birth day—
either July 9, when Louisiana ratified if the rescissions were ineffective, or July 21, 
when Georgia ratified if the rescissions were not—and not its birth month. The 
rescission-of-ratification issue loomed again, still unresolved, in the 1970s, when 
Nebraska, Tennessee, Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota rescinded their ratifications 
of the Equal Rights Amendment. See DANELLE MOON, DAILY LIFE OF WOMEN 
AMONG THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 176–77 (2011). On the loyal denominator view, of 
course, the rescissions came after the Amendment had been enacted; this was the basis 
for New Jersey’s gubernatorial veto (overruled, alas) of the attempted rescission. See 
infra note 249. 
 21. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, 
14 Stat. 428, 428 (Mar. 2, 1867). 
 22. See infra note 259. 
 23. 39th Congress, 1st Session, House Report no. 30, pt. 2, at 3 (June 20, 1866). 
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assumed the Article I and Article V parity of the powers of “the several 
States.” 
John Harrison notes that Republicans did not have any defensible 
theories to maintain Southern Thirteenth Amendment ratifications.24 
Loyal denominatorism holds, however, that the Republicans did not need 
them, and that their actions in denying Article I rights to the South prove 
the point. Loyal denominatorism agrees with Johnson, Rogers, and Grider 
that if the South had Article V rights, it also had Article I rights. 
Performing a modus-tollens-for-modus-ponens switch25 on this reasoning, 
however, loyal denominatorism posits that, in denying the South Article I 
rights of representation, Congress implicitly denied that the South had 
Article V powers. As explained at length below, various leading 
Republicans explicitly made this argument.26 
The same switch can be used against President Johnson’s later 
Thirteenth-Amendment-based attack on the Reconstruction Acts, which 
held that the Southern governments were illegal. Johnson asserted that the 
Reconstruction Act would imperil Thirteenth Amendment legitimacy by 
implicitly pushing Southern states out of the Article V numerator. This is 
not a problem, however, if the Act also implicitly pushes the Southern 
states out of the denominator. Johnson’s argument was as follows: 
This bill . . . denies the legality of the governments of ten of the 
States which participated in the ratification of the amendment to the 
Federal Constitution abolishing slavery forever within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and practically excludes them from 
the Union. If this assumption of the bill be correct their concurrence 
cannot be considered as having been legally given, and the 
                                                                                                             
 24. Harrison, supra note 5, at 416 (“How did the Republicans think they 
could keep those [Thirteenth Amendment] ratifications? I have been unable to 
find a straight answer to this question, perhaps because Republicans were 
unwilling to commit themselves to any one theory.”). 
 25. Modus ponens is the inference of the proposition q from the propositions p 
and p → q. Modus tollens is the inference of the proposition ~p from the 
propositions ~q and p → q. 
 26. See, e.g., the arguments in the Appendix by Frelinghuysen (first 
quotation, infra at 109), Stewart (third quotation, infra at 112), Sumner (eighth 
and ninth quotations, infra at 115), Ashley (first quotation, infra at 115–16), 
Bingham (fifth quotation, infra at 118 ), Broomall (second quotation, infra at 
121), Curtin (second quotation, infra at 129), the Cleveland Daily Leader (first 
quotation, infra at 131), the Emporia News, infra at 131, the Evening Telegraph, 
infra at 131–32, the Daily Ohio Statesman, infra at 133, the New York Herald 
(first quotation, infra at 134–35), and the New York Times (second quotation, infra 
at 135–36). 
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important fact is made to appear that the consent of three fourths of 
the states—the requisite number—has not been constitutionally 
obtained to the ratification of that amendment . . . .27 
Proponents of a loyal denominator agree with Johnson that a full Article 
V denominator, Thirteenth Amendment legitimacy, and the Reconstruction 
Act were an inconsistent triad. Johnson wanted to eliminate the 
Reconstruction Act, but scholars use the same argument to eliminate the full 
denominator. Illegal legislatures cannot ratify constitutional amendments 
any more than they can send Senators to Congress. In refusing to seat their 
Senators, Congress was not willing to allow Southern legislatures to 
exercise federal political authority, but treated these actions as void. 
                                                                                                             
 27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1731 (Mar. 2, 1867) (veto message 
of President Johnson). For other full-denominator-assuming, Thirteenth-
Amendment-based attacks on the Reconstruction Act, see EVENING TELEGRAPH, 
Feb. 27, 1867, at 2 (quoting New York World: “In relation to the State 
Governments, we supposed that the Republican party would be bound by its own 
recognition of those Governments. The importance which they attached to the 
Emancipation amendment, and the fact that they recognized the Southern 
ratifications of it as valid, precluded them, in logic and consistency, from 
afterwards calling in question the competency of the ratifying State Governments. 
Congress has acknowledged the validity of that amendment, in a dozen different 
ways. It has repeatedly made it the basis of legislation, and even in proposing the 
amendment now pending, it recognized its validity by numbering the proposed 
amendment as the fourteenth, which it could not unless there was a thirteenth, and 
the thirteenth is precisely the Emancipation Amendment. It seemed against all 
antecedent probability that a Republican Congress would displace this 
amendment from the Constitution, by declaring that the ratifying States which had 
made up the three-fourths were not competent to act upon it. Even the pending 
amendment was submitted to the Southern States and their ratifications asked. 
Was it to be expected that Congress would so stultify itself as to declare illegal 
the very Governments it had thus recognized?”); NASHVILLE UNION & DISPATCH, 
Dec. 6, 1866, at 4 (“The Radical organ of this city says, that no jurist or statesman 
will affirm that the ratification of the constitutional amendment by the Southern 
States abolishing slavery, has any validity whatever. It also says that their 
Legislatures were illegal assemblies, and had no power to ratify. If this be so, 
slavery is not abolished by law. Without the ratifications of the Southern States 
the proposition failed of a three-fourths assent.”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 544 (Jan. 15, 1868) (Representative James B. Beck of Kentucky: “If that 
constitutional amendment was adopted because of the votes of these States, when 
the Constitution provides that two thirds of Congress may, as it did, submit an 
amendment to the Constitution, and that it shall become a part of that instrument 
when ratified by three fourths of the State Legislatures—if those States had no 
civil State governments how could their State Legislatures act?”). 
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Consistency would require the same for other assertions of federal political 
authority. 
C. Loyal Denominatorism as Recognition of the Naysaying Power of 
Article V 
A second way to see loyal denominatorism is in relation to the exact 
nature of states’ power to reject amendments. The power to say “no” to an 
amendment is tremendously valuable; indeed, the power of a naysaying 
bloc of more than one-fourth of the States to prevent constitutional 
amendments is among the most conservative elements of our 
constitutional structure. Article V, however, does not mention the power 
of a state to say “no” to an amendment by, for instance, passing a 
resolution. States only have the following two powers in the text of Article 
V: (1) the power to say “yes”; and (2) the power to be included in the total 
number of states of which three-fourths must ratify. Loyal denominatorism 
sees the second power as an important power, which the rebellion 
suspended like many other rights. 
Inclusion in the Article V denominator is a critical form of political 
power. In restoring Tennessee in July 1866, Congress claimed that “political 
relations in the Union” were to be restored only upon congressional action.28 
                                                                                                             
 28. Joint Resolution Restoring Tennessee to her Relations to the Union, 14 
Stat. 364 (July 24, 1866). In fuller context, 
[I]n the year eighteen hundred and sixty-one, the government of the State 
of Tennessee was seized upon and taken possession of by persons in 
hostility to the United States; . . . said State government can only be 
restored to its former political relations in the Union by the consent of 
the law-making power of the United States. 
Id. The “former political relations” concept expressed in the joint resolution was 
a more concise form of the ideas set out at much greater length in the report of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction. The report grounds former Confederate 
states’ lack of Article I rights squarely on the rebellion: 
From the time these confederated States thus withdrew their 
representation in Congress and levied war against the United States, the 
great mass of their people became and were insurgents, rebels, traitors, 
and all of them assumed and occupied the political, legal, and practical 
relation of enemies of the United States. . . . The States . . . did not cease 
until . . . their people [were] reduced to the condition of enemies 
conquered in war, entitled only by public law to such rights, privileges, 
and conditions as might be vouchsafed by the conqueror. . . . Having, by 
this treasonable withdrawal from Congress, and by flagrant rebellion and 
war, forfeited all civil and political rights and privileges under the federal 
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The most natural sense of “political relations” includes both positive and 
negative Article V powers as well as those under Article I. Loyal 
denominatorism thus maintains parity between Articles I and V. A former-
Confederate-excluding collection of states could properly ratify a 
Fourteenth Amendment that a former-Confederate-excluding Congress 
properly proposed. 
The parity between Article I and Article V is mirrored in the text. Both 
articles give rights to “the several States,” without any explicit textual 
qualification. Harrison, who finds loyal denominatorism “plausible but 
ultimately unpersuasive,”29 argues that the lack of textual qualification in 
Article V undermines the loyal-denominator theory: “Article V, however, is 
pretty clear about this: three-fourths of the states. If South Carolina was still a 
state, it counted.”30 On the other hand, if the bare text of Article V is deemed 
sufficiently clear to undermine loyal denominatorism, commentators should 
deem provisions regarding “States” in Articles I and II—and elsewhere in 
Article V, guaranteeing equal suffrage in the Senate—equally clear and 
unqualified. “State means state” works just as well for the selection of 
representatives or presidential electors as it does for ratifications. 
A full defense of the legitimacy of reading implicit “non-rebel State” 
qualifications into both Articles I and V appears in the companion to this 
Article.31 Loyal denominatorism renders Congress’s treatment of the two 
articles more coherent: if Congress, in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
acted legitimately in excluding Southern representatives on the ground that 
they were from “rebel States,” Congress must also have adopted an implicitly 
restrictive reading of “the several States” in Article I.32 
                                                                                                             
Constitution, they can only be restored thereto by the permission and 
authority of that constitutional power against which they were subdued. 
Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction xix–xx (1866). The Committee 
sought “adequate safeguards for the future, before restoring the insurrectionary 
States to a participation in the direction of public affairs.” Id. at xxi. The statement 
“[a]ll civil and political rights and privileges under the federal Constitution” 
should be taken to include naysaying Article V denominator rights. 
 29. Harrison, supra note 5, at 375. 
 30. Id. at 421. In addition to the clarity of the text, Harrison also argues from 
the fuzziness of the alternative interpretation of the denominator. Id. at 421–22. 
 31. See Green, supra note 9. 
 32. Harrison has appealed at this point to the finality of Congress’s Article I 
determinations, i.e., the possible fact that others could not legitimately complain 
if Congress improperly refused admission to Southern representatives: “[E]ach 
house of Congress decides whom to admit, and there is nothing anyone else can 
do about that decision.” Id. at 452. He calls this a “basic point of constitutional 
law,” but admits the Supreme Court disagreed in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 550 (1969). Even granting the finality of congressional decisions, Harrison’s 
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The companion to this Article33 considers John Harrison’s distinction 
between Articles I and V: that Article I requires a lawful apparatus of 
officials to operate, but Article V does not. States retained their rights 
under both Articles, he suggests, but were simply unable to exercise some 
of those rights for lack of officials. Although officials can rebel, the state 
itself cannot because secession is illegal. The companion paper attacks this 
view on the merits, but Harrison’s view is inconsistent with the 
Reconstruction Act, which labeled the former Confederate states, with the 
exception of Tennessee, as “rebel states.” Congress treated the states, not 
merely their agents, as unworthy of representation; the action of a state, 
not merely that of its agents, was required for readmission to Congress. If 
the Reconstruction Act was legitimate—and if not, the Fourteenth 
Amendment has significant trouble—this method of distinguishing Article 
I and Article V powers does not work.34  
D. Loyal Denominatorism as Legitimation for the Reconstruction Acts: 
Ackerman, Harrison, Amar, and Colby Contrasted 
The Reconstruction Act’s demand that the Southern states ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a problem for the traditional account; 
ratifications made in response to illegitimate pressure are tarnished, if not 
rendered illegitimate. Loyal denominatorism, however, offers a simple 
explanation for this demand—the Fourteenth Amendment was already the 
law. The demand to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment was therefore like 
the demand that surrendering Confederates acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the Emancipation Proclamation—a pledge of fealty rather than an act of 
constitutional co-authorship. 
Ackerman, Harrison, Amar, and Colby offer a great variety of conflicting 
explanations of Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy and, therefore, of the 
Reconstruction Act. Ackerman sees the Fourteenth Amendment as the first 
                                                                                                             
strict position on the text undermines the legitimacy of those Article I 
determinations, and hence of the Fourteenth Amendment, on which two-thirds 
votes in Congress depended. With friends like Harrison, Fourteenth Amendment 
legitimacy hardly needs enemies. Loyal denominatorism offers an explanation for 
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than its mere existence. 
 33. See Green, supra note 9, at 182–84. 
 34. Similar comments apply to other attempts to justify Congress’s 1866 
decision including problems with particular elections in the South. Even if that 
were a possible theory, the theory of the Reconstruction Act asserts that the 
representatives were from “rebel states,” and that the restoration of “political 
relations” required affirmative congressional action, not that particular elections 
were problematic. 
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great example of a non-Article V amendment that succeeded because of 
the capitulation of other national actors—President Johnson in 1868 and 
the Supreme Court in 1873—in a striking parallel with the events of the 
New Deal.35 Harrison sees the Fourteenth Amendment as the triumph of 
formalism: the unreviewable power of Congress to exclude members as 
long as Congress retains a quorum of the whole membership, and the 
unreviewable power of a state to agree to amendments despite the 
existence of great pressure upon them.36 Amar sees the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the triumph of federally imposed voting rules implemented 
to satisfy the Republican Form of Government clause.37 Colby sees the 
original Fourteenth Amendment as a failure from the perspective of 
legitimacy, but thinks its intergenerationally authored incarnation can gain 
legitimacy from the normative desirability of later cases like Brown v. 
Board of Education.38 
These interpretations take entirely different views of the Reconstruction 
Act of March 2, 1867 than loyal denominatorism would. From the loyal-
denominator view, the Reconstruction Act enforced an amendment that had 
become law 18 days earlier—and only eight days before initial passage of 
the bill39—on February 12, rather than applying federal interference with a 
                                                                                                             
 35. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 233–49. For the 
parallel to the New Deal, see id. at 255–420. 
 36. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 457–58 (“The Republicans . . . got away 
with something Article V probably was supposed to prevent. This is no problem 
for a formalist.”). 
 37. See Amar, Section 5, supra note 6, at 112 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
itself became part of our Constitution thanks to a congressional system (that is, a 
statutory system) of selective preclearance, in which some states but not others 
were required to jump through tight federal hoops because of their bad democratic 
track records in the preceding years.”); Amar et al., Reconstructing the Republic, 
supra note 6, at 114 (“[T]he enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment pivoted on 
a novel interpretation of the Republican Government Clause, an interpretation that 
had not been firmly established by the Founding Fathers.”). 
 38. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Colby, supra note 7, at 
1688 (stating that because of problems with the ratifications, “the normative case 
for originalism does not hold water when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment”); 
id. at 1630 (“[T]he shortcomings in the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could seriously undermine the normative appeal of originalism more generally”); 
id. at 1674 (stating that current acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
acceptance of the amendment as interpreted in cases like Brown). 
 39. Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto on March 2, but because the 
initial passage was on February 20, Johnson could not pocket veto it under U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, which states, “unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
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pending amendment. Under this reading, the Reconstruction Act neither 
destroyed Article V by nationalizing the amendment process, as Ackerman 
would have it, nor read aggressively majoritarian requirements into the 
“republican form of government” of Article IV,40 as Amar would have it. 
The Reconstruction Act was not the means by which the Republicans “got 
away with something Article V probably was supposed to prevent,” 41 as 
Harrison would have it, nor did it merely take another very preliminary 
step in an intergenerational process of authoring the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as Colby would have it. Instead, the Reconstruction Act 
enforced existing law. 
II. A HISTORY OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LOYAL DENOMINATORISM 
This Part first explains the basic textual arguments at play in the loyal-
denominator argument; the companion to this Article defends these 
arguments on the merits. 42 Such textual arguments read implicit limits into 
the federal political powers of “the several States” and “each State” in the 
Constitution. The simplest, strongest version of loyal denominatorism is 
distinguished from the forms that Sumner, Stevens, or Amar have 
advocated. Sumner thought states committed suicide and became 
territories;43 Stevens thought the South successfully seceded but was 
reconquered;44 while Amar links exclusion from the Article V denominator 
to lack of black suffrage, rather than to secession, and thinks Congress was 
required to explicitly adopt a loyal denominator, rather than simply delay 
the existence of peace under the law. 45 
This Part sets out, first chronologically and then by source, the 
arguments for a loyal denominator. The loyal-denominator theory had a 
surprisingly large number of different advocates during the Civil War, 
Reconstruction, and beyond. The theory was not a fringe position associated 
only with the likes of Stevens, Sumner, or an ad hoc rationalization of a 
power grab. Andrew Johnson first presented the loyal-denominator view in 
1861, shortly after the passage of the Johnson–Crittenden War-Aims 
                                                                                                             
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.” See CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1645 (Feb. 20, 1867). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”). 
 41. See supra note 36. 
 42. See Green, supra note 9. 
 43. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 44. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2041 (Apr. 7, 1864) 
 45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 87. 
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Resolutions. The “just a fringe view” idea is the product of historical 
whitewashing. James G. Blaine, seeking favor with the South during his 
presidential campaign in 1884, relegated the loyal denominator to the 
foolish fringe. Ackerman, following Carl Schurz and Blaine, sees Samuel 
Shellabarger, not Stevens or Sumner, as the most popular theorist of 
Reconstruction. Shellabarger, however, also advocated a loyal-denominator 
view, though not with Stevens and Sumner’s exact arguments. Even Blaine 
himself advocated the loyal-denominator view. John Bingham, whom 
Ackerman portrays as abandoning the loyal denominator in February 1867, 
actually stuck with the theory. Many Republicans forcefully advocated loyal 
denominatorism throughout Reconstruction and beyond, and the view 
eventually won favor with several commentators. 
The historical survey is also important in rebutting the strongest 
argument against loyal denominatorism, on which Amar and Harrison rely: 
that at most the theory offered Congress an option that it might use, and that 
Congress decided not to use it in the Reconstruction Act. Although Congress 
as a body did not explicitly embrace the loyal-denominator view, it also did 
not explicitly embrace a former-Confederates-included denominator. Several 
of Congress’ actions implied a loyal denominator, and expressions of loyal 
denominatorism persisted throughout 1868 and after Reconstruction. 
A. Various Textual Homes for Loyal Denominatorism 
The textual argument rooted in the Reconstruction Act’s labeling of 
the former Confederate states besides Tennessee as “rebel states” is 
distinguished from other possible arguments for a loyal denominator. The 
simplest way to exclude the South from “the several States” of Article V 
is to say that the former Confederate territory was not composed of states 
at all, either because they successfully seceded and were reconquered—
Thaddeus Stevens’s view—or because they committed “state suicide”—
Charles Sumner’s view. As the Reconstruction Act affirmed continued 
Southern statehood, however, it is inconsistent with either Stevens’s or 
Sumner’s view. “Rebel states,” are, of course, states rather than territories.46 
                                                                                                             
 46. The Supreme Court later held that, as a “State,” Georgia was subject to 
the requirements of Article I, section 10, clause 3, such as the Contracts Clause, 
but noted that this continuing obligation was consistent with the suspension of 
other constitutional powers. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646, 651 (1872) (“At no time 
were the rebellious states out of the pale of the Union. Their rights under the 
Constitution were suspended, but not destroyed. Their constitutional duties and 
obligations were unaffected, and remained the same.”). The Court noted the acts 
that readmitted Southern representatives suggested the Southern states were states 
all along, albeit states with suspended constitutional privileges. Id. at 651–52. 
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The persistent focus on the rebellion, and not the South’s failure to provide 
sufficient suffrage, was the fundamental rationale for the Reconstruction 
Act. The Act justified military rule of the South during the states’ rebellion 
in 1860 and 1861, rather than states’ failure to provide sufficient voting 
rights for former slaves freed beginning in 1863. Although the 
Reconstruction Act imposed suffrage for freedmen on the South, the 
justification for military reconstruction itself was the suppression of the 
rebellion.47 Like the Emancipation Proclamation, the Reconstruction Act 
was justified as a means of suppressing the rebellion in a sufficiently 
definitive way. The companion to this Article48 defends, under the original 
meaning of Article V, a rebellion-based-suspension-of-rights form rather 
than a successful-secession-and-reconquest, state suicide, or lack-of-
freedmen-suffrage-based forms of loyal denominatorism. A suspension-of-
rights-based loyal denominatorism best fits the Reconstruction Act. 
Tacit limits on “states” also fit with the generally accepted view—
even by surrendering Confederates—that Confederates’ political rights 
were suspended during the war. If we read “states” strictly, the South had 
the right to leave behind representatives to resist the Union’s war aims, 
and the right to select presidential electors to vote against Lincoln in 1864. 
But even the most ardent surrendering Confederates, who objected to 
President Johnson’s imposition of conditions in 1865, thought that some 
sort of surrender was required.49 In the most extreme form of this 
                                                                                                             
 47. It is true that in several states with the largest slave and freedmen 
populations—South Carolina, Louisiana, and Mississippi—a minority of the male 
population held the political power. It is hard to understand why, precisely, they 
were republics rather than racial oligarchies or aristocracies. But this was equally 
true before the war; Madison worried about the same issue in 1792. Notes for the 
National Gazette Essays, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 157–69 
(Hutchinson & Rachal eds., 1962), available at https://founders.archives.gov/doc 
uments/Madison/01-14-02-0144 [https://perma.cc/85BD-9YLU] (“In proportion as 
slavery prevails in a State, the Government, however democratic in name, must be 
aristocratic in fact. The power lies in a part instead of the whole; in the hands of 
property, not of numbers. . . . In Virginia the aristocratic character is increased by 
the rule of suffrage, which requiring a freehold in land excludes nearly half the free 
inhabitants, and must exclude a greater proportion, as the population increases. At 
present the slaves and non-freeholders amount to nearly [three-fourths] of the State. 
The power is therefore in about [one-fourth].”). 
 48. See Green, supra note 9. 
 49. See WILLIAM DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION AND RELATED TOPICS 100 (1897) (noting “Southern theory” as 
one of five theories of Reconstruction; the others were President Johnson’s theory, 
Stevens’s conquered-provinces theory, Sumner’s state suicide theory, and other 
Republicans’ “forfeited rights” theory); id. at 102 (noting that even under 
2018] THE HISTORY OF THE LOYAL DENOMINATOR 67 
 
 
 
surrender-only-required theory, laying down their weapons was enough. 
To be sure, Congress properly thought that it was not enough. Even the 
most extreme former Confederates did not adopt the unqualified “state 
means state” reading of the text. Only after Southern surrender could the 
states claim their federal powers; “state” at the very least did not include 
an actively rebellious state. 
Consideration of the textual parity of Articles I and V heightens the 
implausibility of reading “state” without an implicit limit. The textual 
rationale for including former Confederate states in the Article V 
denominator—that is, the fact that “the several States” is textually 
unqualified in Article V—also applies to legislative powers during the war. 
South Carolina had the right, for example, to be represented in Congress 
during the Civil War despite illegally fighting to leave the Union.50 
Harrison notes the temptation to flexibly interpret Article V to allow 
loyal states to enact constitutional amendments during a rebellion of more 
than one-fourth of the states, like the Civil War: “Common sense says that 
a government cannot allow itself to be paralyzed by treason. . . . If 
subverted states are still in the denominator, a violently disloyal minority 
can freeze the Article V process. That process may be very important 
during a rebellion.”51 Despite Harrison’s argument that the clarity of the 
text outweighs this practical consideration, the fact that treason could 
induce paralysis is a very weighty cost of his view. 
                                                                                                             
Southern theory, “the states, it was admitted, were out of their constitutional 
relation to the general government. Their officers had taken no oath to support the 
Constitution of the United States. No senators or representatives were acting for 
the states in Washington. The authority of the United States judiciary was not 
recognized by state governments. . . . [I]t became the duty of the officers to take the 
oath required by the constitution, of the legislature to provide for the dispatch of 
congressmen to Washington, and of the people of the state to submit to the authority 
of the courts and officials of the national government. These steps having being 
taken, the Union would stand under the constitution as before the war.”). As 
Harrison notes, Dunning’s general normative views in favor of President Johnson 
have come under great criticism, but his account of the five theories of 
Reconstruction is “largely unaffected.” Harrison, supra note 5, at 390 n.82. 
 50. To be sure, Southern Representatives and Senators, most famously 
Jefferson Davis, left voluntarily, see CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess. 487 (Jan. 
21, 1861) (Davis’s farewell to Senate), so the issue of a right to representation from 
possible remaining disloyal states was not faced until December 1865. According 
to the strict no-qualification-in-the-text reading of “the several States,” however, the 
action of Senators like Jefferson Davis leaving Congress needlessly forfeited an 
invaluable constitutional right of the South. 
 51. Harrison, supra note 5, at 421. 
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The chief case on the change in constitutional rights during the war, the 
Prize Cases, likewise lends support to implicit qualifications on the rights 
of “states.” Akin to the Reconstruction Act’s use of the “rebel states” label, 
the Court referred to “states in Rebellion.”52 In approving the blockade of 
the South, unanimously as to seizures following congressional approbation 
and 5–4 as to earlier cases, the Court licensed an implicit qualification to the 
commercial rights of “states” in Article I, Section 9, clause 6: “No 
Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to 
the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .”53 The Court held, this 
constitutional guarantee notwithstanding, “[W]e are of the opinion that the 
President had a right, jure belli, to institute a blockade of ports in possession 
of the States in rebellion which neutrals are bound to regard.”54 
Distinguishing these various arguments allows for a more intelligent 
discussion of the arguments for loyal denominators. Several scholars have 
advocated limiting the Article I, II, and V denominators to reliably loyal 
states: states that Congress accepted back into the exercise of federal 
power. Many people read implicit conditions into Articles I, II, and V, 
such as “loyal States” or “reliably loyal States.” Because these arguments 
began at the same time as the war, it is not always easy to distinguish 
whether the phrase “loyal,” “reliably loyal,” or “facially loyal” correctly 
characterizes the implied restriction; borderline cases applying these 
various concepts only arose beginning in 1865. For the “reliably loyal” 
definition, it is hard to identify exactly how much reliability Congress 
                                                                                                             
 52. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 671 (1863); cf. id. at 668 (“States organized in 
rebellion . . . .”); id. at 671 (“States now in rebellion . . . .”); id. at 673 (“[I]n 
organizing this rebellion, they have acted as States . . . .”). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (emphasis added). Congress noted this issue in 
July 1861 as it discussed the blockade. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 48, 49 (July 10, 1861) (Sen. Trusten Polk mentioning it twice); id. at 58 (Rep. 
Clement Vallandingham); id. at 67 (July 11, 1861) (Sen. Lazarus Powell); id. at 150 
(July 16, 1861) (Rep. Henry Burnett); id. app. at 14 (July 19, 1861) (Sen. James 
Bayard); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (Jan. 8, 1866) (Rep. 
Samuel Shellabarger) (defending the blockade based on suspension of states’ 
Article I rights). 
 54. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671; cf. id. at 688–89 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“It 
is not to be denied, therefore, that if a civil war existed between that portion of the 
people in organized insurrection to overthrow this Government at the time this 
vessel and cargo were seized, and if she was guilty of a violation of the blockade, 
she would be lawful prize of war. But before this insurrection against the 
established Government can be dealt with on the footing of a civil war, within the 
meaning of the law of nations and the Constitution of the United States, and which 
will draw after it belligerent rights, it must be recognized or declared by the war-
making power of the Government.”). 
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might demand to that loyalty. Presumably, Congress was required to 
tolerate a chance of future rebellion or resistance to federal authority.55 All 
of these observers, however, consider states’ naysaying denominator 
power as an important federal power that the nation suspended during the 
rebellion. 
In addition to laying the foundation for a full evaluation of the textual 
and historical merits of the loyal denominator, this historical discussion 
rebuts the historically-rooted arguments against loyal denominatorism, 
chiefly from Ackerman and Colby, but also from Amar, who claims that 
Congress “ultimately opted to include ex-Confederate states in the 
amendment process.”56 
Part B sets out the history of the loyal-denominator view chronologically, 
and Part C sorts instances of loyal denominatorism by source. 
B. A Chronological Tour 
Americans discussed the tacit limits on the rights and powers of the 
states intermittently throughout the Civil War in a great variety of 
contexts. This section distinguishes eight episodes in the debate. 
1. 1861: Andrew Johnson’s Assumption of a Loyal Denominator 
We begin, oddly enough, with Andrew Johnson, the lone Senator from 
a Confederate state who remained loyal to the Union, and co-sponsor of 
the Crittenden–Johnson War-Aims Resolutions, which the House and 
Senate overwhelmingly adopted on July 22 and July 25, 1861. These 
resolutions provided: 
[T]his war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, 
or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of 
overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established 
institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the 
supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all 
the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; 
and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought 
                                                                                                             
 55. For more on the vagueness of the requirement, see Green, supra note 9, 
at 176 (quoting Aristotle and Macaulay on ineliminable vagueness of some moral 
and legal requirements). 
 56. AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 87. 
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to cease.57 
As Ackerman notes, President Johnson “never tired of pointing out” this 
description of the War-Aims Resolutions when attacking the Republicans 
after the war.58 What exactly, however, did “unimpaired” states’ rights 
mean? The term did not mean retention of the naysaying Article V 
denominator power during the war. On July 27, two days after the Senate 
approved his resolution, Johnson rebutted Democratic insinuations that the 
North would abolish slavery in the states as soon as it could by pointing out 
that, even with the reduced Article V denominator, and thus the power to 
pass an anti-slavery amendment under the loyal-denominator theory, the 
free states had not sought to do so: 
It has been said that the one great object was, first to abolish 
slavery in the District of Columbia and the slave trade between the 
states, as a kind of initiative measure; next, to exclude it from the 
Territories; and when the free States were three fourths of all the 
States, so as to have power to change the Constitution, they would 
amend the Constitution so as to give Congress the power to 
legislate upon the subject of slavery in the States, and to expel it 
from the States in which it is now. Has not that been the argument? 
Now, how does the matter stand? At the last session of Congress 
seven States withdrew, it may be said that eight withdrew, reducing 
the remaining slave states down to one fourth of the whole number 
of States. Now we have reached the point at which the charge has 
been made, that whenever the free States constituted a majority in 
the Congress of the United States, sufficient to amend the 
Constitution, they would so amend it as to legislate upon the 
institution of slavery within the States, and that the institution of 
slavery would be overthrown.59 
                                                                                                             
 57. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (July 22, 1861) (House 
approval); id. at 265 (July 25, 1861) (Senate approval). 
 58. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 113; see also Colby, 
supra note 7, at 1682 (following Ackerman on the inconsistency of a loyal 
denominator with the resolutions). 
 59. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (July 27, 1861) (emphases 
added). Earlier in the year, Senator Anthony assumed, in discussing compromise 
proposals, that seceding states were still in the Article V denominator. CONG. 
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess. 408 (Jan. 16, 1861) (“Four States are already out 
of the Union, so far as their own act can place them without it; three others are 
waiting impatiently for the forms of secession, which shall sever them from the 
flag of their country. Seven States would refuse even to consider a proposition of 
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Amending the Constitution during the war only required three-fourths 
of the loyal states for Johnson. “Unimpaired” states’ rights, therefore, were 
only the ultimate aim of the war, not a statement of the status of those rights 
during the rebellion itself. Indeed, Congress’s approval of Lincoln’s 
blockade required the same temporary-impairments-allowed interpretation 
of the resolutions.60 The constitutional commercial rights of states subject to 
a blockade would not continue without any interruption during the war; at 
best, the rights would resume once peace was achieved. How long that peace 
would take, and what measures would be required to defeat the 
Confederacy, were obviously unknown in July 1861. The Crittenden–
Johnson resolutions left open how much security, and over what sort of time 
frame, constitutional supremacy, and the preservation of the Union would 
require. 
2. February 1862: Sumner’s State Suicide Theory 
In February 1862, Charles Sumner proposed resolutions that would 
exclude the Confederacy from Articles I, II, and V by moving the 
Confederacy entirely to the status of Article IV territories. Sumner’s “state 
suicide” theory contended that all powers of states were abandoned with 
the attempted secession. Sumner meant all powers, even purely domestic 
powers, producing the added benefit—most likely a motivating feature—
that institutions like slavery that required domestic law automatically 
ceased to exist. Sumner argued: 
[A]ny acts of secession or other act by which any State may 
undertake to put an end to the supremacy of the Constitution 
within its territory is inoperative and void against the Constitution, 
and when sustained by force it becomes a practical abdication by 
the State of all rights under the Constitution, while the treason 
which it involves still farther works an instant forfeiture of all 
those functions and powers essential to the continued existence of 
the State as a body-politic, so that from that time forward the 
territory falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress as other 
                                                                                                             
amendment to the Constitution. This would leave, in all the other States, but one 
to spare to form a constitutional majority. To adopt an amendment to the 
Constitution requires the assent of twenty-five States; only twenty-six States 
would vote upon it.”). 
 60. An Act to Provide for the Collection of Duties on Imports, and for Other 
Purposes, 12 Stat. 255, §§ 5–6, at 257 (July 13, 1861); see supra notes 52–54 and 
accompanying text. 
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territory, and the State being, according to the language of the law, 
felo-de-se [i.e., a suicide], ceases to exist.61 
Sumner’s theory conflicted with the Reconstruction Act. Still, Sumner 
was ahead of the curve in thinking about the legal problems of 
Reconstruction, and his solution implied a loyal denominator. Sumner 
offered a simple conceptual framework that would make clear that the 
North, once it had won the war, would remain in a genuine position of 
victory. Alternative theories of Reconstruction that emerged later differed 
on many details, but all of the theories shared Sumner’s fundamental goal 
to explain how the security of Union war aims could be extended into 
peacetime. To the extent that those aims required change to the 
Constitution, a loyal Article V denominator or its functional equivalent 
were essential. 
3. December 1862: West Virginia 
In December 1862, Congress and Lincoln’s cabinet debated the 
admission of West Virginia, carved out of the state of Virginia without 
consent from the majority of people of the state, in violation of the 
requirements of Article IV, Section 3, clause 1.62 A hill country remnant 
                                                                                                             
 61. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 737 (Feb. 11, 1862) (emphasis 
added). Representative Pendleton, criticizing the Thirteenth Amendment, noted 
that the theory was already almost three years old in January 1865. See CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (Jan. 11, 1865) (“[Representative Ashley] holds 
that an act of secession is an abdication by the people of their rights but not a 
release of their duties; that it destroys, not the tie which binds them to the Union, 
but their form of Government, leaving them subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government and its absolute sovereignty with all the rights of local 
government, and he deduces from this the conclusion that the seceding States have 
no voice on this amendment, but are absolutely bound by it. That doctrine was 
promulgated by a Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] nearly three years 
ago in a series of resolutions presented to the Senate . . . .”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or 
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the 
States concerned as well as of the Congress.” (emphasis added)). The story is told 
in great detail in the first part of Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is 
West Virginia Constitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 297–32 (2002). The second 
part is a fascinatingly intricate discussion of the semicolon after “other State,” 
which could make the clause prohibiting carving new states out of old states 
categorical, rather than only requiring old states’ consent, although reasons exist 
to reject this reading. Id. at 332–95. 
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“Virginia” legislature meeting in Wheeling, which those in the Western 
counties and near the District of Columbia, such as Alexandria, passed a 
resolution of consent. Republicans generally argued that by rebelling, the 
majority forfeited their right to be asked for consent under Article IV. 
Representative William P. Sheffield put the point in terms of Virginian 
estoppel: 
It may be said that it is hard for these two thirds [i.e., the Eastern 
two-thirds of Virginia, governed by Richmond] to have us divide 
their territory without their consent. But, sir, they have put it in 
our power to do it by their own wrongful acts, and they are 
estopped from saying that it is unjust for us to do this thing.63  
Representative Horace Maynard put the point in terms of moral 
responsibility for the consequences of secession: 
[T]he pride of old Virginia may be wounded by seeing her 
mountain sons set up as a rival Commonwealth. Virginia, in 
common with the other rebellious regions, has earned it all. . . . 
Treason, rebellion, secession, war, have been brought upon them 
by their own bad, bold men, and with them be the consequences. 
We are not responsible for them.64  
John Bingham equated rebellion with forfeiture of the right to speak for 
the state: “[I]f the majority of the people of Virginia have turned rebels, as 
I believe they have, the State is in the loyal minority.”65 
Thaddeus Stevens and his allies articulated the point in a more radical 
form:  
[N]one of the States now in rebellion are entitled to the protection 
of the Constitution . . . . I say, then, that we may admit West 
Virginia as a new State, not by virtue of any provision of the 
Constitution, but under our absolute power which the laws of war 
give us in the circumstances in which we are placed.66  
Representative Martin Conway similarly spoke about why it was 
permissible to ignore Virginia’s Article IV rights: “[O]ur seceded states . . . 
are out of the Union by having acquired at least a belligerent character, thus 
securing an international status incompatible with their Federal relations. 
                                                                                                             
 63. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 56 (Dec. 10, 1862). 
 64. Id. at 49 (Dec. 9, 1862). 
 65. Id. at 57 (Dec. 10, 1862). 
 66. Id. at 50 (Dec. 9, 1862). 
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This . . . makes their territory subject to our sovereign will whenever we 
take it from them.”67 Using some of the same phrases, Representative 
Abram Olin also applied Stevens’ successful-secession-and-reconquest 
view: “I maintain that, in this instance, in reference to these rebellious 
States, they have acquired a belligerent character which gives them an 
international status which is entirely incompatible with the Federal status. 
They are beyond the Federal system.”68 
Lincoln similarly argued that the eastern Virginians forfeited their 
right to speak for Virginia in asserting Article IV rights: “Can this 
government stand, if it indulges constitutional constructions by which men 
in open rebellion against it, are to be accounted, man for man, the equals 
of those who maintain their loyalty to it?”69 Under Lincoln’s view, the 
government only needed to consult loyal Virginians. Secretary of the 
Treasury, and future Chief Justice, Salmon P. Chase argued, “The 
legislature of Virginia, it may be admitted, did not contain many members 
from the eastern counties. It contained, however, representatives from all 
counties whose inhabitants were not either rebels themselves or dominated 
by greater numbers of rebels.”70 
For the Republicans supporting West Virginia statehood, to be a rebel 
was to forfeit the right to participate in the institutions that exercised 
Virginia’s Article IV rights. To that extent, the West Virginia debate gives 
strong support to one of the pillars of a loyal denominator: secession 
suspended Confederates’ constitutional rights. The Appalachian and D.C. 
area counties of Virginia, where loyalists had the upper hand, constituted 
the entire electorate choosing a legislature that would exercise Virginia’s 
Article IV rights—the denominator, a structured majority of which was 
required to control Virginia’s Article IV decision-making. 
Some Republicans’ comments, however, understood secession as 
merely limiting Confederates’ right to speak for Virginia—not Virginia’s 
rights. The loyal denominator, however, requires a limit on state rights as 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 38. 
 68. Id. at 45. 
 69. Abraham Lincoln, Opinion on the Admission of West Virginia into the 
Union, in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 27, Dec. 31, 1862 (Basler 
ed., 1953). Salmon P. Chase argued similarly, 
It would have been as absurd as it would have been impolitic to deny to 
the large loyal population of Virginia the powers of a State government, 
because men, whom they had clothed with executive or legislative or 
judicial powers, had betrayed their trusts and joined in rebellion against 
their country. 
JOHN G. NICOLAY & JOHN HAY, 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY 302 (1886). 
 70. NICOLAY & HAY, supra note 69, at 302. 
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such. If the Wheeling legislature had inherited Virginia’s rights by being 
loyal to the Union, perhaps it is a mistake to say that Virginia had even 
attempted to secede. Rather, those claiming to secede had, ipso facto, 
forfeited the right to act on Virginia’s behalf. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the artificial entity of “Virginia” was, by its nature, simply 
incapable of attempting to secede. The individuals who misbehaved were, 
to coin a phrase, “ipso facto ultra vires”—by virtue of the fact of 
rebellion—the individuals were beyond their authority to act on Virginia’s 
behalf. 
As explained in the companion to this Article, at one time, this sort of 
theory convinced many people that artificial entities like corporations 
could shield themselves from criminal liability simply by prohibiting their 
employees from committing crimes; that interpretation, however, of 
corporate misbehavior is now generally seen as an intellectual mistake.71 
The Wheeling legislature’s inheritance of Virginia’s rights and powers 
under the Constitution—in the eyes of some supporters of West Virginia 
statehood—did not entail that there would always be such an entity able 
to inherit. Virginia’s geographical and political situation allowed a 
uniquely sharp division between generally loyal and disloyal parts of the 
state that Union armies could defend relatively easily. The problems of 
rebel-right forfeiture cannot always be navigated by imposing forfeitures 
of constitutional rights on individuals rather than on states. Further, the 
use of county divisions to mark boundaries between the states indicates 
that the forfeitures of secession attach to at least some artificial entities.72 
When the Union created West Virginia, counties in which rebels were in 
control, not merely individual rebels, but counties—Unionist residents 
included—were excluded from participation in the creation process. 
4. 1861 to 1864: Disputes over the Quorum 
Denominators are not unique to Article V; provisions relating to 
states’ powers under Articles I and II also refer to fractions, thus requiring 
an assessment of the relevant denominators. Congress generally construed 
such provisions to refer to fractions of those from loyal states.73 The 
quorum rule of Article I, Section 5 provides that, “[e]ach House shall be 
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Green, supra note 9, at 182–84. 
 72. Exactly which counties was a litigated issue before the Supreme Court in 
1871. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39 (1871) (making a 6–3 decision in 
favor of inclusion of Berkeley and Jefferson counties in West Virginia). 
 73. For Congress’s treatment of Article I, see immediately infra; for its 
treatment of Article II, see infra notes 100–120 and accompanying text. 
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and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business. . . .”74 
During the war, both Houses of Congress eventually decided that this 
provision meant only a majority of representatives from the loyal states.  
The House of Representatives excluded the Confederacy from its 
quorum calculations starting from its first meeting in July 1861.75 The 
Senate made the same decision only after Senator John Sherman of Ohio 
pressed the issue for several years. In 1862, Sherman explained the 
reduced denominator: 
If you adopt any other principle you acknowledge the worst 
feature of secession. . . . [T]he Constitution is a machine intended 
to be perpetual, and it is not in the power either of a minority of 
the States or of a minority of the people of the States to break it 
up. A very small minority of the people of the United States might 
break up the Government, if it required thirty-five Senators always 
to be here to constitute a quorum. . . . It all turns on the question 
of whether or not a majority of all the Senators that might by 
possibility be elected—that is, a majority of sixty-eight—or 
whether a majority of those who have been elected, and are 
entitled to take their seats—that is, a majority of forty-nine—
constitutes a quorum.76 
                                                                                                             
 74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Twelfth Amendment 
and its predecessor in Article II similarly use fractions regarding presidential 
selection. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII, ¶ 3 (“The person having the greatest 
Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority 
of the whole number of Electors appointed . . . .”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (identical “Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed” 
provision in original Constitution); U.S. CONST. amend. XII, ¶ 3 (“[I]n choosing 
the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state 
having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members 
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to 
a choice.”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (identical reference to 
“Member or Members from two-thirds of the States” in original Constitution). For 
the February 1865 dispute over “States” and these fractions in Article II, see infra 
notes 100–120 and accompanying text. 
 75. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (July 19, 1861) (ruling by 
Speaker of the House Galusha Grow that House has 183 members, of which 92 
would be quorum). Including absent Confederates for quorum calculations would 
have meant a House size of 241 and a quorum of 121, considerably harder to meet 
out of only 183 loyal members. 
 76. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3022 (June 30, 1862). 
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Sherman explained a few days later, “The opposite doctrine to that for 
which I contend, is the doctrine of secession.”77 The Senate put off this 
question, however, for several years.78 Sherman pressed the quorum 
reform measure steadily until the Senate finally changed its interpretation 
rule by a 26–11 vote in May 1864.79 Democrat Reverdy Johnson, one of 
the most thoughtful Democratic critics of Reconstruction, was one of 
Sherman’s allies in seeking the reading of “majority” in Article I that fit 
the practical situation: 
Suppose it be doubtful. It cannot be, I submit to my friend from 
Kentucky [Garrett Davis, later a far less thoughtful foe of 
Reconstruction], so very clear. Then if it be doubtful, what should 
we do in the present condition of the country? Adopt that rule 
which the convenience of the legislation requires, which the 
business of our country demands at our hands . . . .80 
 
Tacit loyalty-based limits on the word “majority” were, then, 
commonplace, even among those who would later resist such limits on the 
word “state.” 
5. 1864 and 1865: Wade–Davis, the Thirteenth Amendment, and 
Article II 
As the Union army gradually suppressed the rebellion in different 
parts of the South, the Lincoln administration faced an immediate need to 
establish civil order. The military sought to allow locally selected officials 
to exercise power when practicable, but Congress and the President 
disputed what criteria to use to lend such officials republican or democratic 
legitimacy. The year 1864 saw the discussion and passage of the Wade–
Davis Bill, which would have required the President to reconstruct the 
South on the basis of the vote of a majority of the electorates, rather than 
through Lincoln’s much more lenient “ten percent plan,” which would 
hold initial elections with fewer southern voters.81 Lincoln pocket vetoed 
the bill after its passage on July 2, although he said he would attempt to 
follow the bill’s guidelines.82 The Senate also passed the Thirteenth 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 3190 (July 9, 1862). 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 3194 (tabling Sherman’s motion). 
 79. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2087 (May 4, 1864). 
 80. Id. at 2086. 
 81. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: 
CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869 70–83 (1974). 
 82. Id. 
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Amendment on April 8, but on June 15, the Amendment fell 13 votes shy 
of two-thirds in the House, with a final vote of 93–65. During these events, 
discussion often turned toward the Article V denominator. Nevada became 
the 36th state admitted into the Union in October 1864. A loyal 
denominator before October would have required 18 of 24 states to ratify; 
a full denominator would have required 27 of 35 states. 
Representative Henry Winter Davis, co-sponsor of the Wade–Davis 
Bill, briefly alluded to loyal denominatorism on March 22.83 He noted 
Thaddeus Stevens’s agreement with loyal denominatorism and 
enigmatically suggested that the view was “not without countenance in high 
judicial quarters.”84 Davis foresaw, however, that loyal denominatorism 
would “probably encounter as much doubt as the bill before this House,” 
i.e., the Wade–Davis bill itself, which Davis thought was more pressing than 
a possible constitutional amendment.85 
On April 7, just before the Senate approved the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Democratic Senator Hendricks of Indiana argued that many 
states—including the Confederacy, but also Kentucky, Missouri, and 
Delaware—were in “no condition to consider amendments to the 
Constitution.”86 Jacob Howard interrupted, “If those States to which he 
refers are not in a condition to participate in the amendment of the 
Constitution, as is contemplated by this joint resolution, whose fault will 
it be? Can a party in that attitude take advantage of his own fault, of his 
own wrong?”87 Hendricks pressed Howard on the number required for 
ratification; Howard replied by reiterating that secessionists’ failure to 
participate was their own fault.88 When pressed again, Howard replied, 
“Of course, I suppose, there must be a concurrence of the constitutional 
number of States, which number would be three fourths of the States of 
the Union, or, in the language of the Constitution, in the Union.”89 At that 
time, another Senator jumped in with questions for Hendricks, so whether 
Howard’s “in the Union” language meant to convey loyal denominatorism 
is unclear; but less than a year later during the presidential-elector 
discussion, Howard expressed loyal denominatorism with zeal.90 
                                                                                                             
 83. See infra note 230. Davis referred to 34 states, possibly forgetting (or 
refusing to acknowledge) West Virginia, admitted as the 35th state in June 1863. 
 84. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (Mar. 22, 1864). 
 85. Id. 
 86. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1457 (Apr. 7, 1864). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See infra notes 111–115 and accompanying text (discussing Article II on 
a partly territorial model) and note 212. 
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Democratic Senator Henderson’s attack on loyal denominatorism 
discussed later in this Article demonstrates the issue was present.91 
On May 2, 1864, Thaddeus Stevens laid out his conquered-provinces 
theory. Criticizing the committee’s version of the Wade–Davis Bill, he 
said of the South’s “rights under the Constitution” that “war has abrogated 
them all.”92 
The next day, Representative Daniel Gooch of Massachusetts struck a 
similar note, tying all rights under the Constitution to the recognition of 
Congress’s Article I rights: 
[A]s the governments in the revolted States have by treason, 
rebellion, and adhesion to the southern confederacy been 
overthrown and destroyed, no such State can have any status in 
the Union for any purpose until a loyal State government shall 
have been established therein, and recognized by the Congress of 
the United States. And when that shall have been done it will 
become the duty of the other departments to immediately 
recognize the act and accord such State all the rights and privileges 
of a State in the Union.93 
The same day, William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania offered the first 
extended defense of a loyal denominator in the specific context of Article 
V, quoting Stevens’s proposed rule that only “three fourths of the non-
seceding States” were required. 94 Kelley expressed complete confidence 
that the Supreme Court would agree with him on the point.95 He echoed 
Sumner’s idea of state suicide.96 Representative Daniel Morris advanced a 
more nuanced form of loyal denominatorism on May 31.97 Morris saw the 
Confederacy as in the Union as to a duty of fealty, but out as to Article I 
and Article V power—“three fourths of the now loyal States” was enough 
for him.98 
Loyal denominatorism was not, of course, universal among proponents 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. Three senators who would later advocate a 
                                                                                                             
 91. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1463 (Apr. 7, 1864) (“To consider 
the seceded States out of the Union and take the sanction of three fourths of the 
remainder will be attacked for unconstitutionality.”). 
 92. Id. at 2041 (May 2, 1864). 
 93. Id. at 2071 (May 3, 1864). 
 94. See infra note 238. 
 95. See infra note 238. 
 96. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2078 (May 3, 1864) (“[A] State may 
commit suicide.”). 
 97. See infra note 240. 
 98. See infra note 240. 
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loyal denominator—Henry Wilson and Lyman Trumbull in March, and 
James Harlan in April—supported a full denominator view in 1864.99 
Davis, Gooch, Kelley, Morris, and Stevens showed, however, that 
proponents offered a loyal Article V denominator as one interpretation of 
the legal problem of Reconstruction. 
The denominator issue loomed as Lincoln was reelected in November 
1864: would electors from the portions of the former Confederacy under 
Union control count as part of the relevant “majority” of electoral votes 
required under Article II and the Jeffersonian modification to presidential 
selection in the Twelfth Amendment? Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana 
tried to exercise Article II rights by appointing electors. Congress rejected 
their electoral votes, passing a resolution on February 8, 1865 that declared 
the South was not entitled to representation in the Electoral College.100 In 
the discussions leading to that decision, Senator Wade101 and 
Representative James Wilson102 pressed Article II loyal denominatorism. 
Although the House passed the resolution without a recorded vote,103 the 
                                                                                                             
 99. See infra notes 218 (Wilson), 217 (Trumbull), and 211 (Harlan). 
 100. Resolution No. 12, 13 Stat. 567, 567–68 (Feb. 8, 1865): 
Whereas the inhabitants and local authorities of the States of Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee rebelled against the 
government of the United States, and were in such a condition on the 
eighth day of November, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, that no valid 
recognition for electors of President and Vice President of the United 
States, according to the constitution and laws thereof, was held therein 
on said day: Therefore . . . the states mentioned in the preamble to this 
joint resolution are not entitled to representation in the electoral college 
for the choice of President and Vice-President of the United States, for 
the term of office commencing on the fourth day of March, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-five; and no electoral votes shall be received or 
counted from said states concerning the choice of President and Vice-
President for said term of office. 
 101. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (Dec. 7, 1864) (presenting petition 
“remonstrating against the admission of Senators or Representatives from the 
pretended State of Louisiana into the Congress of the United States, and the 
reception of any electoral vote of that State in counting the votes for President and 
Vice President of the United States . . . .”). 
 102. Id. at 65 (Dec. 19, 1864) (Wilson “introduced a joint resolution declaring 
certain States not entitled to representation in the electoral college”); id. at 82 
(reporting back and recommitting resolution from Judiciary Committee). 
 103. Id. at 505 (Jan. 30, 1865) (House passing initial version without recorded 
vote); id. at 595 (Feb. 4, 1865) (Senate passing version with revised preamble, 
29–10); id. at 602 (Feb. 4, 1865) (House concurring in Senate amendment). 
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Senate was more active. Senator Van Eyck proposed allowing electoral 
votes from Louisiana.104 Trumbull noted that Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
Louisiana had appointed electors, but that Congress had the power to 
decide when to restore states’ Article II privileges.105 Senators Howe106 
and Harris107 argued that the rebellion had substantially ended in 
Louisiana, justifying the counting of their electoral votes. Senator Harris 
associated states’ Article I and Article II powers, arguing that both 
questions should be left open.108 Reverdy Johnson vehemently denied that 
                                                                                                             
Lincoln signed the bill, but with some third-person disclaimers. See id. at 688 
(Lincoln’s statement of Feb. 8, 1865): 
In his own view, however, the two Houses of Congress, convened under 
the twelfth article of the Constitution, have complete power to exclude 
from counting all electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal; and it is 
not competent for the Executive to defeat or obstruct that power by a 
veto, as would be the case if his action were at all essential in the matter. 
He disclaims all right of the Executive to interfere in any way in the 
manner of canvassing or counting electoral votes; and he also disclaims 
that, by signing said resolution, he has expressed any opinion on the 
recitals of the preamble, or any judgment of his own upon the subject of 
the resolution. 
Id. at 711 (same reported to Senate). 
 104. Id. at 533 (Feb. 1, 1865). He noted that generally, the rebellion suspended 
states’ federal privileges: 
[W]henever the testimony is furnished to my mind that these States have, 
by the aid of the General Government, or by the efforts of their own 
people, or by the act of both combined, reestablished themselves, so to 
speak, or set their State governments in action anew and have 
commenced again to revolve in their old orbits, I shall feel it to be my 
duty, so far as I am concerned, to extend to them all the privileges and 
all the rights which the loyal people of a loyal State are entitled to at the 
hands of their sister States, whether upon this floor or anywhere else. 
Id. at 535. 
 105. Id. at 534; see also id. at 535 (“[U]ntil there shall be some action by 
Congress recognizing the organization which has been set up in Louisiana, we 
ought not to count electoral votes from that State. We have not done so yet, and 
until we do it we ought not to count the electoral vote.”). 
 106. Id. at 536. 
 107. Id. at 537. 
 108. Id. at 548 (Feb. 2, 1865): 
It is true that the States specified did rebel; the first part of the recital is 
true; but that the inhabitants of those States and the local authorities of 
all of those States were in a state of armed rebellion on the 8th day of 
November, the day of the presidential election, I am not prepared to 
assert. On the contrary, I choose to leave that question open. I think it 
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those in a state in rebellion had Article II powers, despite still being in the 
Union.109 Johnson said that the rebel states were “[not in a constitutional 
sense but practically] out of the Union,” adding in response to a question 
that rebel states were “not out in one sense.”110 
Senator Jacob Howard’s contribution to the February 1865 Article II 
debate offered an unusually clear and full theory of Reconstruction, 
essentially the same as Shellabarger’s articulation a year later: states still 
existed, but had no more federal political authority than territories. 
Howard noted the general theoretical importance of the issue, even though 
the electoral votes at issue would not affect whether Lincoln prevailed over 
McClellan: “I certainly regard it as a measure of very great importance, 
especially as a precedent for the future, and as indicating the opinion of 
Congress on the subject, to use a familiar term, of ‘reconstruction,’ or 
rather the rights of the States in rebellion.”111 Howard went on, noting that 
Reverdy Johnson’s speech in favor of the resolution gave him “a little 
gratification” because it represented “the sentiment which I long since 
expressed upon this floor.”112 Howard’s theory had an important affinity 
with Thaddeus Stevens’s “conquered province” story: “[T]he United 
States . . . have the same power and authority over the conquered States, 
over the communities once States in this Union but now conquered and 
subjected by our arms as the nation itself would possess over foreign 
territory conquered in the same way.”113 Howard stressed an important 
difference, though this suspension of states’ rights could not last forever: 
 
[I]n the case of a conquest of a rebel State by the arms of the 
United States the Government hold the territory thus subdued in 
trust for a specific purpose, and that purpose is to restore it 
ultimately and in its own discretion to its original position in the 
Union, to the enjoyment of all the functions and privileges 
pertaining to or required of a State of the United States under the 
Constitution.114 
                                                                                                             
ought to be left open until the question as to whether or not the Senators 
who are now applying for admission here from the State of Louisiana 
shall be admitted shall be brought before the Senate. 
 109. Id. at 553. Johnson asked incredulously, “[I]s it possible that the 
inhabitants of a State thus at war with the United States have a right to vote in any 
Presidential election for President of the United States?” Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 554. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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Howard explained that the suspension might last until the government 
reliably reestablished loyalty: 
[Such a condition would last] until I am perfectly satisfied, upon 
due evidence, that the decided majority of the voting population 
of the State has become loyal to the Government of the United 
States, is friendly to that Government, and is willing and anxious 
to proceed in the discharge of the functions of the State of the 
Union, honestly and fairly . . . .115 
Senators Pomeroy116 and Sherman117 likewise associated states’ 
Article I and Article II powers.118 Senator Collamer spoke generally of the 
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. Howard reiterated the distinction between his views and Sumner’s 
state suicide view two days later, responding to Doolittle’s characterization. Id. at 
578 (Feb. 3, 1865): 
[T]he power of the United States over a conquered State which has been 
in rebellion is the ordinary power of the conqueror over conquered 
territory; but that in this particular case there is superadded to the rights 
and duties of the conqueror a trust, growing out of the Constitution of 
the United States, which is to be performed by the United States in its 
discretion and in due time, in the shape of a restoration of the conquered 
State to the Union. Congress may take its own time to bring about this 
restoration. There are no limitations in the Constitution in regard to the 
mode or time in which it is to be done. The territory, however, having 
been once a State, must be restored to its condition of a State by the 
action of Congress at some time . . . . 
 116. Id. at 555 (“I do not suppose that States that are not represented in either 
House of Congress should have a representation in the Electoral College.”); id. 
(“Under the instructions and impressions that the members from Arkansas received 
here last session, they distinctly understood that States not represented in either 
branch of Congress would have no right to vote at the presidential election.”). 
 117. Id. at 579 (Feb. 3, 1865) (“The idea that Louisiana shall vote in the 
Electoral College and make a President for us when no man can speak for her 
here, and no man can speak for her in the House of Representatives, is, in my 
judgment, an absurdity.”). 
 118. Later, Congressmen looked back on the Article II precedent, especially 
in 1868 when the same question recurred. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 855 (Feb. 4, 1868) (Senator George H. Williams of Oregon): 
[D]oes not the Constitution in express terms confer the right upon every 
State to vote for President and Vice President of the United States? If in 
consequence of this rebellion those States forfeited that right, I will ask 
if they did not necessarily forfeit other express and implied rights under 
the Constitution? 
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suspension of states’ powers under the Constitution.119 The New York 
World, critical of Republicans, noted the parity between Article II and 
Article V powers.120 
A week before the Article II decision, on January 31, 1865, the House 
approved the Thirteenth Amendment for which it had come 13 votes short 
of two-thirds the previous June. Although loyal denominatorism was not 
included in Steven Spielberg’s version of that vote in Lincoln,121 loyal 
denominatorism received a significant amount of discussion in Congress, 
the press, and legal treatises during 1865. The government thus 
prominently set the loyal denominator before the public mind during the 
proposal and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In January 1865, several Representatives 
advocated a loyal denominator, as others either noted the issue and left it 
open or assumed that Republicans would use the theory.122 Senator 
Sumner and Representative Stevens added defenses of a loyal 
denominator in February;123 following Sumner’s lead, the National Anti-
                                                                                                             
Id. at 3605 (June 30, 1868) (Senator Henry Anthony of Rhode Island): “I take it 
that the representation in the Electoral College depends precisely upon the same 
principle that should govern representation in the two Houses of Congress. . . . 
[I]f Congress has a right to affirm the disability, it depends upon Congress to say 
when the disability ceases.” This time, Congress acted before the election and tied 
Article I and Article II rights together, 15 Stat. 257 (July 20, 1868), and only 
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia were excluded from the presidential election. 
 119. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 590 (Feb. 4, 1865): 
[T]he States which have been declared in a state of insurrection are 
incapable of exercising their privileges or their duties within this 
Government as integral parts of this Union while they continue in that 
situation, and . . . their restoration shall be either by an act of Congress 
or by the reception of their representatives by the two Houses. 
Id. at 592 (“Congress may, in fixing the status of these States . . . make it one of 
the conditions of their again exercising their franchise as integral members of the 
Union, that they shall be placed in a position which will enable the Union to 
continue and exist.”). 
 120. “[I]f they [Arkansas and Tennessee] should ratify [the Thirteenth 
Amendment], the question fairly arises whether States that are not permitted to 
vote for President can be parties to a change in the fundamental law.” THE NEW 
YORK WORLD, reprinted in HOLMES COUNTY FARMER, Feb. 9, 1865, at 2. 
 121. LINCOLN (Dreamworks Pictures 2012). 
 122. See infra notes 219 (Ashley), 231 (Thomas T. Davis), 246 (Starr), 226 
(Broomall leaving issue open), 272 (Rogers opposing the amendment but 
assuming that Republicans would use a loyal denominator to legitimize it), and 
273 (2007 historian Holzer noting same assumption). 
 123. See infra notes 216 (Sumner) and 247 (Stevens). 
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Slavery Standard promoted loyal denominatorism in March.124 Joel 
Prentiss Bishop similarly defended the loyal denominator when discussing 
slavery in his 1865 treatise.125 Lincoln’s last public address, three days 
before his assassination on April 14, left loyal denominatorism regarding 
the Thirteenth Amendment conspicuously open, refusing to commit to 
either a full or a loyal denominator: 
To meet this proposition, it has been argued that no more than 
three fourths of those States which have not attempted secession 
are necessary to validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit 
myself against this, further than to say that such a ratification 
would be questionable, and sure to be persistently questioned; 
while a ratification by three-fourths of all the States would be 
unquestioned and unquestionable.126 
This sort of agnosticism appeared again and again in discussions of 
the Article V process. In 1867, important Republicans holding the balance 
of power in Congress, like John Sherman, refused to be pinned down either 
way. As a result of the prevalence of such professed agnosticism, the South 
was ultimately invited to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment without 
Congress’s position being made clear; whether the South was actually 
participating in the adoption of the Amendment or demonstrating its 
loyalty to an amendment already adopted was uncertain. Ackerman 
interprets Congress’s failure to affirmatively adopt loyal denominatorism 
as a rejection of the view.127 Lincoln’s agnosticism, however, had two 
sides, just as did the agnosticism of those who would follow him: Lincoln 
refused to reject the loyal denominator, even as he refused to embrace it. 
                                                                                                             
 124. See infra note 252. 
 125. See infra note 264. 
 126. See Last Public Address, Apr. 11, 1865, in 8 COLLECTED WORKS, supra 
note 69, at 404. Lincoln’s statement was recalled and paired alongside Thaddeus 
Stevens’s loyal denominatorism in the Memphis Daily Appeal, Feb. 9, 1867, at 2. 
Lincoln assumed a full denominator in proposing a gradual compensated 
emancipation amendment in December 1862. See Journal of the Senate, Dec. 1, 
1862, at 22 (“The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law. It cannot 
become such without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and, 
afterwards, three-fourths of the States. The requisite three-fourths of the States 
will necessarily include seven of the slave States.”). 
 127. For instance, Ackerman harps on Congress’s failure to declare the 
Fourteenth Amendment ratified in July 1867, when Seward reported 20 
ratifications. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 445–46 n.41. 
Ackerman also harps on Henry Wilson’s delay until Seward proclaimed the 
Thirteenth Amendment ratified. Id. at 155–56.  
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Similarly, individuals who noted there was a significant unresolved issue 
regarding the loyal denominator—and were therefore unsure whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment was in the Constitution between February 1867 
and July 1868128—did not assert that the South was free to ignore the 
Fourteenth Amendment during that time. Taking agnostics at their word 
means not taking their indecision as the embrace of a full denominator. 
The Thirteenth Amendment achieved three-fourths of the loyal 
denominator on June 30, 1865. Congress was not in session at the time, 
but advocates of the loyal denominator were paying attention. In July 
1865, Representative Henry Winter Davis, who articulated the Article V 
loyal denominator over a year before, in March 1864, noted his view that 
the Thirteenth Amendment was already part of the Constitution.129 In 
September 1865, the National Republican noted the open issue of whether 
the Thirteenth Amendment was already the law.130 
These discussions of tacit limits on “states” in a wide variety of 
constitutional contexts underscore that the loyal denominator was not an 
innovation improvised only to legitimate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Inferring implicit limits of the Constitution’s powers to reliably loyal 
states was, instead, the typical Republican interpretation of the 
Constitution during the rebellion.  
6. Late 1865 and 1866: Disputes Over Thirteenth Amendment 
Legitimacy 
As Republicans debated different theories of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s legitimacy at length before drafters wrote the Fourteenth 
Amendment, these discussions offer a full picture of the intellectual 
background before the main Fourteenth Amendment events of 1866, 1867, 
and 1868 unfolded. Loyal denominatorism was alive and well before the 
Fourteenth Amendment was even a gleam in John Bingham’s eye. 
December 1865 was a busy month. On December 4, Congress met 
again, excluding the South, and on December 6, Georgia’s ratification 
supplied three-fourths of the full denominator. Secretary of State Seward 
proclaimed the Thirteenth Amendment ratified on December 18, explicitly 
adopting full denominatorism.131 It is wrong, however, to characterize 
Seward’s proclamation as meaning that “Southern states had been 
                                                                                                             
 128.  See infra Appendix (expressions of agnosticism by Edmunds, Sherman, 
Miller, Williams, Raymond, and the National Republican). 
 129. See infra note 230. 
 130. See infra note 288. 
 131. 13 Stat. 774, 775 (proclamation by Secretary of State William H. Seward, 
Dec. 18, 1865) (“[T]he whole number of states in the United States is thirty-six.”). 
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included in the denominator for the Thirteenth Amendment.”132 Seward 
included them in the denominator, but he had no authority to settle the 
question,133 and various Republicans had argued throughout the year that 
they were outside the denominator. As Dunning noted later, “Much abuse 
has been heaped upon Mr. Seward for his action in recognizing the right 
of the rebel states to vote on this matter.”134 Unsurprisingly, loyal 
denominatorism gained popularity in December 1865, advocated outside 
Congress and in Congress in January 1866.135 
Shellabarger mentioned the power to stop constitutional amendments 
alongside other suspended constitutional privileges of the South in an 
important January 8, 1866 speech.136 Shellabarger’s embrace of an Article 
V loyal denominator is particularly telling in light of James Blaine’s 
comments on the subject, on which Ackerman relies heavily.137 In 1884, 
Blaine wrote: 
The great majority of the Republican leaders, however, did not at 
all agree with the theory of Mr. Stevens and the mass of the party 
were steadily against him. The one signal proof of their dissent 
from the extreme doctrine was their absolute unwillingness to 
attempt an amendment to the Constitution by the ratification of 
three-fourths of the Loyal States only, and their insisting that it 
must be three-fourths of all the States, North and South.138 
                                                                                                             
 132. Colby, supra note 7, at 1643 (relying on ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, 
supra note 1, at 103). 
 133. Seward’s July 1868 proclamations about the Fourteenth Amendment 
make this very clear. See 15 Stat. 706, 707 (proclamation of July 20, 1868): 
[N]either the act just quoted from [the 1818 act for publication of the 
laws of the United States, at 3 Stat. 439 (1818)] nor any other law, 
expressly or by conclusive implication, authorizes the Secretary of State 
to determine and decide doubtful questions as to the authenticity of the 
organization of State legislatures, or as to the power of any State 
legislature to recall a previous act or resolution of ratification of any 
amendment to the Constitution . . . . 
 134. DUNNING, supra note 49, at 117–18. 
 135. See infra notes 225 (Bromwell), 226 (Broomall), 234 (Farnsworth), 236 
(Jenckes), 242 (Schenck), 244 (Shellabarger), and 245 (Spalding). 
 136. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 142–45 (Jan. 8, 1866). 
 137. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 446. Ackerman 
states the date as 1886, rather than 1884. It is true that one of the more widely 
available copies of Blaine’s book is marked with an 1886 publication date, but the 
copyright on the 1886 printing is dated 1884. See infra note 138. 
 138. JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO 
GARFIELD 140 (1884). 
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Like Ackerman, Blaine claimed that Stevens’s view was just the view 
of the fringe, and Blaine pointed to Shellabarger’s view as the more 
mainstream Republican position.139 Blaine then cited the rejection of the 
loyal denominator as proof that most Republicans rejected Stevens’s view. 
But Shellabarger himself contended that the South lost its Article V 
privileges with secession, together with all other federal political 
authority.140 Blaine’s account has another fatal flaw: Blaine himself—
although he repudiated the loyal denominator in 1866—advocated a loyal 
denominator in February 1867.141 
Further good reason to be skeptical of Blaine’s 1884 statements about 
the South exists. Blaine was about to become the first Republican to lose 
a presidential election since John Fremont’s maiden run for the party in 
1856, and he was especially keen on currying favor in the South. 
Cultivating Southern self-esteem by claiming the Confederacy had never 
forfeited its Article V rights except in the eyes of a few radicals was 
evidently part of that plan.142 Representative John Roy Lynch’s memoir 
blames Blaine as the chief source of the Republican Party’s failure to 
persevere in protecting the Reconstruction governments in the South 
against violence and fraud, and ascribes to Blaine a particularly naïve 
understanding of Southern politics in 1884.143 In Lynch’s view, Blaine had 
been critical to the defeat of voting-rights legislation at the end of 
Republican control of the House of Representatives in February 1875144 
and in suppressing a March 1877 investigation into the election of L.Q.C. 
Lamar as Mississippi’s first “post-Redemption” Senator following 
widespread pre-election violence.145 Lynch depicts Blaine as thinking that 
his kindness to Lamar in allowing Reconstruction to die in Mississippi 
would help Blaine’s chances in carrying the state.146 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at 135. 
 140. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 142–45 (Jan. 8, 1866). 
 141. See infra note 222. 
 142. JOHN R. LYNCH, THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1913). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 131 (regarding the Federal Elections Bill, “It is safe to say that 
this bill would have passed both Houses and become a law, but for the unexpected 
opposition of Speaker Blaine”); id. at 134–35 (conversation between Blaine and 
Lynch revealing Blaine’s political motives in undermining the bill). 
 145. Id. at 186–89 (recounting Blaine’s surprise support for Lamar in March 
1877 when both Blaine and Lamar were entering the Senate, thus undermining 
Senator Oliver Morton’s plan to investigate the violence in Mississippi). 
 146. Id. at 225 (Lynch telling Blaine in 1884 that fraud would prevent Blaine 
from getting a fair vote in Mississippi, but Blaine insisting that Lamar would help 
him receive one); id. at 226: 
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In short, the discussions from December 1865 and January 1866 
plainly show that Republicans simply did not accept the full-
denominatorism of Seward’s Thirteenth Amendment proclamation; 
Republicans had their own straightforward loyal-denominator theory of 
Thirteenth Amendment legitimacy available. Nineteen of the loyal twenty-
five states ratified by the summer of 1865, making the Southern 
ratifications superfluous.147 Seward’s official listing of the Southern 
ratifications changed nothing about whether those ratifications came from 
states with the power to say “no” and to be included in the relevant 
denominator. 
7. 1866 to 1867: The Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction Act 
Throughout the consideration and proposal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and predecessor proposals in the spring of 1866, Republicans 
continued to push the loyal denominator in February and March. 148 When 
drafters proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress in May, several 
representatives pressed the theory again.149 Although some elements of the 
press that would later embrace a loyal denominator denied the theory in 
1866,150 other press outlets embraced it151 or noted its popularity among 
Republicans.152  
After Congress proposed the Amendment by two-thirds votes of both 
houses in June, it invited Southern states to give their assent, but only one 
took them up on the offer: Tennessee, in July 1866. Following its assent, 
Tennessee was immediately readmitted to Congress just before the first 
session of the 39th Congress closed.153 Congress’s treatment of 
Tennessee’s proof of renewed loyalty in its Fourteenth Amendment 
ratification—and particularly the congressional description of Tennessee’s 
                                                                                                             
Mr. Blaine had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about a condition 
of affairs at the South which made it impossible for any of his 
Democratic or Republican friends in that section to be of any material 
service to him at the time [i.e., in the election of 1884] he most needed 
them. 
 147. See supra note 20. 
 148. See infra notes 214 (Lane), 225 (Bromwell), and 226 (Broomall), 247 
(Stevens). 
 149. See infra notes 247 (Stevens), 223 (Bingham), and 233 (Eliot). 
 150. See infra notes 256 (Evening Telegraph) and 260 (The New York Times), 
 151. See infra note 258 (The Nation). 
 152. See infra notes 277 (Daily Phoenix), 278 (Lynchburg News), and 279 
(Nashville Daily Union). 
 153. See supra note 20. 
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status before it had given such proof—is its clearest embrace of the 
suspended rights of the South. Congress asserted in the readmission joint 
resolution that Tennessee’s “[s]tate government can only be restored to its 
former political relations in the Union by the consent of the law-making 
power of the United States.”154 In context, “political relations in the 
Union” included Article I rights; this category likely includes Article V 
denominator rights as well. 
Loyal denominatorism was an important topic during the campaign in 
the fall of 1866, which Republicans won decisively, both in elections for 
the 40th Congress and in-state elections for the legislatures that would 
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment en masse in January and February 1867. 
The New York Times, which did not convert to loyal denominatorism until 
January 1867, again assumed a full-denominatorism view in October.155 
The New York Herald changed positions during the fall: advocating a loyal 
denominator in October, then switching back to a full denominator at the 
beginning of November, before coming back to loyal denominatorism—
full force and at length—at the end of November.156 The Baltimore Gazette 
noted the popularity of loyal denominatorism in November.157 In 
December, the lame duck second session of the 39th Congress met, and 
many members and newspapers advocated a loyal denominator. 
Republicans were the party of loyal-only rule, either in Congress or in the 
adoption of amendments, and voters got what they wanted.158 
In January and February 1867, congressional exposition of the loyal 
denominator came to a crescendo as the critical three-fourths-of-
represented-states threshold approached and culminated on February 12 
with Pennsylvania’s ratification. Many congressmen and newspapers 
advocated a loyal denominator, and others kept the issue open or noted its 
popularity.159  
                                                                                                             
 154.  See supra note 20. 
 155. See infra note 260. 
 156. See infra note 259. 
 157. See infra note 276. 
 158. See infra notes 212 (Howard), 216 (Sumner), 218 (Wilson), 245 
(Spalding), 255 (Emporia News), 259 (New York Herald), 261 (Raftsman’s 
Journal), 256 (Evening Telegraph), and 281 (Staunton Spectator). 
 159. See infra notes 220 (Baker), 223 (Bingham), 225 (Bromwell), 229 
(Cullom), 237 (Julian), 238 (Kelley), 241 (Pike), 243 (Scofield), 245 (Spalding), 
247 (Stevens), 256 (Evening Telegraph, noting popularity), 259 (New York 
Herald), 260 (New York Times), 263 (Western Reserve Chronicle), 285 (Miller, 
leaving issue open), 287 (Raymond, open), and 280 (New York Tribune, noting 
popularity), 212 (Howard), 213 (Harlan), 215 (Stewart), 216 (Sumner), 221 
(Banks), 222 (Blaine), 232 (Delano), 235 (Ingersoll), 253 (Boston Post), 259 (New 
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The discussions in Pennsylvania are particularly instructive, both 
because the state was the key 20th ratification, and because Delaware 
recorded the 10th rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment on February 7, 
1867.160 If these “no” votes were to hold, the only reason for Northern 
states to ratify would be the loyal-denominator theory. Further, the 
Pennsylvania House considered and rejected almost 2:1 a motion in favor 
of a full Article V denominator.161 When Pennsylvania pulled the nation 
across the loyal-denominator three-fourths threshold, it did so with its eyes 
wide open. Andrew Gregg Curtin, the governor of Pennsylvania whose 
term ended in January 1867, made his loyal-denominatorism clear; and the 
future Democratic U.S. Senator William Wallace, then in the state senate, 
noted the prevalence of loyal-denominatorism during the debate on 
ratification.162 
The House passed a resolution on February 4, 1867 requesting a report 
from Seward on ratifications, specifically limited to states represented in 
Congress.163 Seward replied with a list of only nine states, leaving out eight 
states that had ratified in January, but whose certifications apparently had 
not yet been received in Washington.164 The House did so again on 
February 15, 1867,165 and Seward replied with five more states,166 still 
                                                                                                             
York Herald), and 277 (Daily Phoenix, noting popularity). Blaine’s statement in 
favor of a loyal denominator is especially significant here, because he later falsely 
claimed that very few Republicans believed it. See supra notes 137–146 and 
accompanying text. 
 160. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 20. 
 161. See JOSEPH BLISS JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 165 (1984) (57–31 vote against “a statement that Southern states 
should be considered in the number necessary for ratification”). 
 162. See infra notes 248 (Curtin) and 274 (Wallace). 
 163. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 994 (Feb. 4, 1867) (resolution 
offered by Bingham, approved by unanimous consent). 
 164. Id. at 1029 (Feb. 6, 1867) (listing Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Vermont, West Virginia, Kansas, Missouri, and an incompletely-
authenticated ratification from New Hampshire). Of these states, all but Vermont, 
West Virginia, Kansas, and Missouri were 1866 ratifications. Ohio, New York, 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Maine, Nevada, and Indiana, all January 1867 ratifiers, 
were not included. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 20. 
 165. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1262 (Feb. 15, 1867) (resolution 
offered by Wilson, approved by unanimous consent). 
 166. Id. at 1348 (Feb. 19, 1867) (letter from President Johnson referring to 
Seward report, but not accompanied in Globe by report itself); House of 
Representatives, 39th Cong. 2nd Sess, House Ex. Doc. No. 94 (Feb. 19, 1867) 
(available at https://goo.gl/QiMV2b [https://perma.cc/V37B-9LXC]) (Feb. 16 
letter of Seward listing Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York). That 
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leaving out six states. The House passed a resolution on July 5, 1867 
requesting a report on state ratifications.167 Seward replied on July 19 with 
a list of 20 states,168 leaving out two states. This two-state omission is 
particularly significant because Nebraska’s entrance into the Union on 
March 1, 1867, raised the loyal-denominator three-fourths threshold from 
20 to 21. This change offers a simple reply to Ackerman’s question of why 
Congress did not press ahead with an official declaration of a loyal-
denominator Fourteenth Amendment169—the paperwork on one more 
ratification would need to be processed. Congressional unwillingness to 
challenge Seward’s role in formally receiving ratifications did not 
abandon its members’ clearly-stated views on the number of ratifications 
required. 
The fact that certifications were often slow to reach official quarters 
in Washington explains another aspect of the Reconstruction Act that 
could repudiate the loyal denominator: on March 2, 1867, Congress 
referred to the time when the Fourteenth Amendment would become part 
of the Constitution, as well as the time that Southern states approved it.170 
In the absence of all the proper certifications, there may have been 
uncertainty as to the exact time that ratifications would count.171 The loyal 
denominator itself had edged up to 27 on March 1, 1867 when Nebraska 
became a state, meaning that on March 2, fewer than three-fourths of the 
then-represented states had ratified. Massachusetts brought the loyal-
denominator ratification fraction back over three-fourths, to 21 of 27, on 
March 20. The Congress passing the Reconstruction Act knew that the 
loyal-denominator threshold had been passed; waiting for the paperwork 
could, however, justify the language of the statute. 
                                                                                                             
left out Michigan, Maine, and Nevada from January 1867 and Rhode Island, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania from February 1867. See supra note 20. 
 167. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (July 5, 1867) (resolution 
offered by Scofield, approved by unanimous consent). 
 168. Id. at 740 (July 19, 1867) (listing 20 states). Seward omitted Maine, which 
ratified in January 1867, and Nebraska, which ratified in June 1867. See CONG. 
RES. SERV., supra note 20. There was also uncertainty about exactly when 
Nebraska would fulfill the conditions for statehood set out in the statute of 
admission.  
 169. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 445–46 n.41. 
 170. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, 
14 Stat. 428, 429 sec. 5 (Mar. 2, 1867) (referring to the time “when said article 
shall have become a part of the Constitution of the United States”).  
 171. On July 21, 1868, Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax held a 
gubernatorial telegram of Georgia’s ratification insufficient: “The Chair doubts 
whether this is an official notice such as is required. It should be sent by mail.” 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4296 (July 21, 1868). 
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The interpretation of the Reconstruction Act marks an important 
divide between the approach of this Article and that of Akhil Amar.172 
Amar views the Reconstruction Act as the repudiation of a loyal 
denominator, rather than its implementation.173 On the theory here, the 
Reconstruction Act imposed a Fourteenth Amendment already binding on 
the South. On Amar’s theory, however, the Reconstruction Act demanded 
that the South participate in an act of forced co-authorship of the 
amendment, rather than purely submitting to already established law.  
For all of his loyal-denominator-friendly remarks—his “true blue 
only” approach—Amar ultimately agrees with Ackerman that Congress 
decided not to legitimize the Fourteenth Amendment through the loyal-
denominator theory, though Amar thinks Congress could have done so.174 
His only reason for the conclusion that Congress “ultimately opted to 
include ex-Confederate states in the amendment process,”175 is his 
interpretation of the Reconstruction Act: “Congress improvised a two-
stage strategy that relied heavily on the verdict of the true-blue states in 
the first stage of enactment, but then gave ex-gray states an important role 
during the final stage of enactment.”176 The Reconstruction Act, however, 
did not invite the South to contribute ratifications which would count under 
Article V; it invited the South to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
precondition to readmission in Congress.  
Many advocates of the loyal denominator understood this invitation as 
a pledge of loyalty to an already-established amendment.177 Virginia, 
                                                                                                             
 172. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 174. AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 87. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 413 (Southern ratifications “were a pledge of 
loyalty, not a constitutional necessity” under loyal-denominator theory); infra notes 
217 (Trumbull: “The constitutional amendments were never, in point of fact, 
submitted by Congress to any of these rebel States. They were proposed and 
submitted to the States of the Union. . . . We had the acquiescence of these pretended 
State governments to it, and it did no harm. I am glad we had it. That it was 
necessary I do not admit.”); 223 (Bingham: “[I]f three fourths of the organized and 
represented States put this amendment into the Constitution of the United States, it 
will bind the insurgent States and give them the benefits of it as well, whenever in 
good faith those States choose to accept it”); 242 (“Schenck . . . insisted that this 
amendment ‘should be adopted by three-fourths of the loyal States before admitting 
the other States,’ and that they, the now excluded States, as a condition of 
restoration, should be required to ratify it”); 256 (Scofield: “[I]f sent to them by us 
it was only to allow them an opportunity to prove their loyalty by giving it their 
assent”); 200 (Spalding: “Upon the hypothesis that their action on it only goes to 
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Texas, and Mississippi were also required to approve the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even though they were admitted to representation long after 
July 1868. Those ratifications were unambiguously pledges of loyalty; 
loyal denominatorism would interpret the 1868 ratifications similarly. 
Amar and his coauthors have correctly pointed out Ackerman’s 
misconstruction of Bingham’s position in February 1867.178 Ackerman 
reads Bingham as abandoning the loyal denominator in a speech on 
February 13—the day after Pennsylvania’s critical 20th ratification.179 But 
Bingham actually embraced it in the very speech Ackerman cites for the 
proposition.180 Bingham celebrated Pennsylvania’s critical ratification the 
day before: “They [the freedmen] ask that that decree of the people who 
saved the nation’s life, and which, thank God, by the recorded legislative act 
of twenty represented States of this Union has become a part of the supreme 
law of the land, shall be enforced by act of Congress.”181 Ackerman, 
however, understood this speech as rejecting a loyal denominator. “By 
February, [Bingham] abandoned radical mathematics and adopted an 
                                                                                                             
show their submission to the terms we are trying to impose, they will permit the 
loyal States to make this a part of the Constitution of the United States by a three-
fourths vote, and then come in a express their acceptance of it.”); 247 (Stevens: “[I]n 
adopting those amendments their [former Confederate States’] aid will neither be 
desired nor permitted, but . . . when they enter the Union they will swear allegiance 
to a Constitution to which the consent of their legislatures shall not be asked.”); 259 
(N.Y. Herald: “We may establish the constitutional amendment by three-fourths of 
the loyal States, and then reorganize territorially each of the outside States . . . [T]hey 
may come in on the terms of the amendment.”); 263 (Western Reserve Chronicle: 
“[I]t is an act of mere grace to ask the late rebellious States to ratify the Amendment. 
Their approval or disapproval amounts to nothing, farther than indicating their 
temper.”); 267 (Andrews: “The ratification by the disloyal States was simply . . . an 
evidence that they might be restored with safety to their former condition in the 
Union.”); 269 (Wright: “It is true that Congress, when reconstructing the seceded 
States, required them to ratify the recent amendments. But this was done not for the 
sake of securing their votes to make the amendment valid, but as a guarantee that 
the seceded States had accepted the results of the war in good faith.”); 278 
(Lynchburg News: “The programme . . . is evident, viz.: to announce the adoption 
of the proposed amendment as soon as it shall have been ratified by three-fourths of 
the States now represented, and to make its subsequent ratification by the Southern 
states an indispensable condition of their restoration”); and 279 (Nashville Daily 
Union: “Three-fourths of the States now represented in Congress are to be deemed 
sufficient for the ratification of the proposed amendment; and its ratification by the 
other States is to be required only as a condition”). 
 178. Amar et al., Reconstructing the Republic, supra note 6, at 126 n.27. 
 179. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 196. 
 180. See infra note 223. 
 181. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1211 (Feb. 13, 1867). 
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alternative scheme that envisioned ratification by a super-majority of all the 
states.”182 Amar rightly calls this a “misleading account,”183 and points to 
Bingham’s statements in 1868 supporting a loyal denominator.184 
Bingham’s 1868 statements, however, likewise undermine Amar’s claim 
that the Reconstruction Act made the Confederates part of the process of 
constitutional adoption.  
In sum, Bingham drafted the critical language of Section One, but also 
paid careful attention to the progress of ratification over time. He was on 
watch when the critical threshold was passed and continued explaining the 
loyal-denominator theory long enough into Reconstruction to make it clear 
to careful observers that the loyal denominator had not been abandoned in 
the Reconstruction Act. 
8. Later in 1867 and Beyond 
The persistence of expressions of loyal denominatorism even after 
Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts in March 1867 reveals that 
Congress had not embraced a full denominator in the Acts.185 In 
September, Sherman left the issue open, as did the Evening Telegraph in 
November.186 The New York Herald continued to advocate a loyal 
denominator the same month.187 In June 1867, Timothy Farrar’s treatise 
adopted a loyal denominator by including the Fourteenth Amendment in 
his copy of the Constitution.188 The 1868 edition of Joel Prentiss Bishop’s 
treatise likewise retained his 1865 adoption of loyal denominatorism, 
although Paschal’s 1868 treatise left the issue open.189 
In late spring of 1868, the process initiated in the Reconstruction Act 
began to produce Southern acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment; first, 
however, a flurry of congressmen expressed loyal denominatorism.190 New 
                                                                                                             
 182. Ackerman, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 196. 
 183. Amar et al., Reconstructing the Republic, supra note 6, at 126 n.27. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See infra notes 216 (Sumner), 223 (Bingham), 253 (Boston Post), and 
239 (Lawrence). 
 186. See infra notes 256 (Evening Telegraph) and 284 (Sherman). 
 187. See infra notes 284 (Sherman), 256 (Evening Telegraph), and 259 (New 
York Herald). 
 188. See infra note 266. 
 189. See infra notes 264 (Bishop) and 271 (Paschal). 
 190. See infra notes 209 (Fessenden); 210 (Frelinghuysen); 211 (Harlan); 212 
(Howard); 215 (Stewart); 216 (Sumner); 217 (Trumbull); 223 (Bingham); 227 
(Cobb); 228 (Colfax); 224 (Boutwell); 238 (Kelley); 247 (Stevens); 249 (New 
Jersey Governor Ward); 257 (Montana Post); 277 (Daily Phoenix, noting 
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Jersey Governor Ward’s adoption of the loyal denominator came in a veto—
which a Democratic state legislature overrode—of an attempted rescission 
of New Jersey’s ratification.191 Ward insisted that the rescission was too 
late—the Fourteenth Amendment had already entered the Constitution.192 
None of these 1868 advocates of loyal denominatorism had any 
indication that Congress had given up on the issue; neither did any of the 
treatise writers providing loyal-denominator explanations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s legitimacy years later: Andrews in 1874, Hurd 
in 1881, Wright in 1889, and Burgess in 1902.193 
Several Republicans, like Edmunds, Miller, Morton, Sherman, and 
Williams, wanted to remain indecisive on the scope of the denominator 
and wait for Southern ratifications until July 1868 before insisting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was law. Statements in support of a full Article V 
denominator, however, were quite rare among Republicans, let alone 
reasoned defense of the position. Harrison says that “[a] few came out 
explicitly against” a loyal denominator, but the only example he gives is 
Charles Drake of Missouri194 Drake was not in Congress during the 
framing of either the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 or the 
Reconstruction Act in 1867; Drake served only part of a single Senate term 
from 1867 until 1870, when he joined the Court of Claims.195 Even Drake, 
Harrison concedes, “hedged a little.”196 Drake wanted to wait for more 
Southern ratifications before admitting Arkansas, noting the condition in 
the Reconstruction Act requiring that the Fourteenth Amendment itself 
become law before states would be allowed back in Congress.197  
Senators Trumbull and Fowler then approached Drake, causing him to 
back off slightly: “It does require twenty-eight, in my judgment. At any 
rate, you never can get it declared in any such way as to give satisfaction 
and peace to the people of this country.”198 Senator Roscoe Conkling, a 
                                                                                                             
popularity); 282 (Edmunds, open); 283 (Morton, open); 285 (Miller, open); and 
286 (Williams, open). 
 191. See infra note 249. 
 192. See infra note 249. Ohio also attempted to rescind, producing the July 9–
21 side dispute over the Fourteenth Amendment’s full-denominator birthday. See 
supra note 20. 
 193. See infra notes 267 (Andrews), 268 (Hurd), 269 (Wright), and 270 (Burgess). 
 194. Harrison, supra note 5, at 413–14. 
 195. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000484 [https://perma.cc 
/Q8RX-9UK3] (last visited Oct. 4 2018). 
 196. Harrison, supra note 5, at 414 n.206. 
 197. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2628 (May 28, 1868). 
 198. Id. 
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member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and also a member of 
the House in 1866, raised similar questions during the debate on 
Arkansas’s readmission, suggesting he also thought the Reconstruction 
Act’s Fourteenth-Amendment-adopted condition had not yet been met.199 
Like Drake, however, he backpedaled shortly later, expressing apparent 
agnosticism.200 Nevertheless, Congress passed the Arkansas bill.201 
Running Conkling’s argument in reverse, Congress’s June 1868 passage 
itself could be, in tandem with the Reconstruction Act’s Fourteenth-
Amendment-becoming-the-law readmission condition, an implicit 
assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment was indeed already the law. 
The House and Senate passed a resolution on July 21, 1868, declaring 
that “three fourths and more of the several States of the Union” had ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment, including states from the South on its list.202 
Congress conspicuously left out, however, the sort of language that 
Seward included in his December 1865 statement on the Thirteenth 
Amendment on the size of the denominator. By merely stating that 
Southern states ratified, Congress did not settle the capacity in which they 
had done so—as authors or as demonstrations of loyalty.203 
The lack of perfect clarity from Congress is not fatal to this argument, 
which depends on congressional power to delay the return of 
Confederates’ federal political authority, absent some reason to adopt a 
clear statement rule in favor of secessionists’ rights. Congress itself used 
a contrary presumption in its readmission of Tennessee in July 1866: 
positive action from the law-making power is required in order for federal 
political relations to be restored. A loyal denominator follows if the 
following are met: (1) the rebellion suspended the naysaying Article V 
denominator power; and (2) Congress had taken no action restoring such 
power. Congress restored such powers implicitly when Article I powers 
were restored; there is also no clear statement rule against the 
reestablishment of rebels’ rights. Absent reason to think otherwise, 
assuming Article I and V parity is appropriate. 
The legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment does not depend on the 
adoption of a theory of the legitimacy of the Amendment, only the truth 
                                                                                                             
 199. Id. at 2607 (May 27, 1868) (condition not met). 
 200. Id. at 2665 (May 29, 1868) (“Without going back of the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution, be it ratified now or about to be ratified . . . .”). 
 201. An Act to Admit the State of Arkansas to Representation in Congress, 15 
Stat. 72 (June 22, 1868).  
 202. Id. at 4266 (July 21, 1868) (Senate resolution listing Ohio, New Jersey, 
and several Southern states); id. at 4296 (House concurring in resolution). 
 203. See AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6. 
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of the theory.204 This is the flip side of the warning that Reverdy Johnson 
gave in February 1867, shortly before he became the only Democratic vote 
in favor of any Reconstruction measure by voting for the Reconstruction 
Act.205 Johnson argued that even if Congress pushed through the 
Fourteenth Amendment on a loyal-denominator theory, the Supreme 
Court might disagree and invalidate the amendment.206 The truth of the 
theory of legitimacy was critical, not its congressional recognition.207 
Likewise, if three-fourths of the represented states, in fact, had the power 
to enact the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s later agnosticism and 
failure to adopt the theory in a more official and forceful manner cannot 
take such power away. As one anonymous commentator on the Ohio and 
New Jersey issue put it, “[T]he ratification of the amendment depended 
upon the fact of three-fourths of the States having assented to it, and not 
upon the proclamation of the Secretary of State, nor upon a joint resolution 
of Congress . . . .”208 This statement is correct; Article V declares that 
amendments are valid “when ratified,” not when Congress is fully satisfied 
of the validity of such ratifications and their sufficiency as a portion of 
reliably-loyal states. 
                                                                                                             
 204. For more, see Green, supra note 9, at 190–94. 
 205. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1393 (Feb. 15, 1867). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id:  
When will the Constitution be amended by the ratification of three fourths 
of those States that are represented? Who is to decide that? That is an open 
question, and must be an open question just as much after you have 
declared that it is to be a part of the Constitution when ratified by three 
fourths as if you leave it blank. If in point of law the States that are now 
represented are the States to whom it is to be referred and by whom is to 
be ratified the constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, then the 
Constitution of the United States will be altered in that respect; but if it is 
to be submitted to more than the States that are represented in Congress, 
that is to say, to all the States, the question will be open whether Congress 
declares it or not, and that is a question of constitutional law which 
Congress cannot decide by any declaration. It may go for what it is worth, 
that in the opinion of Congress (if that should be the action of Congress) 
the Constitution may be amended by the ratification of three fourths of the 
represented States, but whenever the question arises in the judiciary it will 
be governed by other considerations. It must be governed by what is the 
meaning of the Constitution in that particular . . . . 
 208. Note, The Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted, 30 AM. L. REV. 894, 896 
(1896). 
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C. A Survey of Arguments and Support for Loyal Denominatorism 
 In addition to the chronological arrangement of loyal denominatorism 
during the course of the Civil War and Reconstruction, it will be useful to 
survey loyal-denominator arguments by source as well. 
1. Officials 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, several dozen Senators and 
Representatives expressed loyal denominatorism, often at great length: 
x Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine;209 
x Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey;210 
x Senator James Harlan of Iowa;211 
x Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan;212 
x Senator Samuel J. Kirkwood of Iowa;213 
x Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana;214 
x Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada;215 
x Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts;216 
                                                                                                             
 209. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 709 (Jan. 23, 1868) (concurring in 
Trumbull’s insistence that only the Secretary of State, and not Congress, 
submitted the Thirteenth Amendment to former Confederate states). 
 210. Id. at 2692 (May 30, 1868); id. at 2862 (June 5, 1868) (“[A]s I have said 
before, I am satisfied that the fourteenth amendment is now adopted.”). 
 211. Id. at 1073–74 (Feb. 10, 1868). Four years before, Harlan included 
Confederates in the denominator. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1437 (Apr. 
6, 1864). 
 212. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 186 (Dec. 19, 1866); id. at 1365 
(Feb. 15, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2863–64 (June 5, 1868); 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 987 (Feb. 8, 1869). 
 213. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1393 (Feb. 15, 1867). 
 214. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 740 (Feb. 8, 1866). 
 215. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1366 (Feb. 15, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 
40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 327 (Jan. 6, 1868); id. at 661 (Jan. 21, 1868); id. at 662. 
 216. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 588 (Feb. 4, 1865); CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Dec. 4, 1865); id. at 91–92 (Dec. 20, 1865); CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (Dec. 4, 1866); id. at 1396 (Feb. 15, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 
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x Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois;217 
x Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts;218  
x Representative James M. Ashley of Ohio;219 
x Representative Jehu Baker of Illinois;220 
x Representative Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts;221 
x Representative James G. Blaine of Maine;222 
x Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio;223 
                                                                                                             
40th Cong., 1st Sess. 439 (Mar. 29, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
453 (Jan. 10, 1868); id. at 877 (Jan. 31, 1868); id. at 1145 (Feb. 13, 1868). 
 217. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 709 (Jan. 23, 1868). Trumbull 
included Confederates in the denominator in 1864. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1314 (Mar. 28, 1864) (“[I]s probable that it can have the ratification of three 
fourths of the States? We now have thirty-five States . . . .”). 
 218. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 192 (Dec. 19, 1866). In 1864, 
Wilson included Confederates in the denominator. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1180 (Mar. 18, 1864) (“It will require the sanction of three fourths of the 
States; and where can you count twenty-seven legislatures to-day that you have 
any security for?”). 
 219. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 140 (Jan. 6, 1865); CONG. GLOBE, 
40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 119 (Dec. 10, 1867). 
 220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 76 (Jan. 17, 1867). 
 221. Id. at 176 (Feb. 9, 1867). 
 222. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1182 (Feb. 12, 1867). For more on 
Blaine’s later claim about the unpopularity of the loyal denominator, see supra 
notes 137–146 and accompanying text. It is true that Blaine disavowed loyal 
denominatorism as unpopular on the campaign trail in 1866 before embracing it 
in 1867 and then disavowing it again in 1884. See The Fourteenth Amendment as 
a Basis of Reconstruction, in LIFE OF HON. JAMES G. BLAINE, CONTAINING AN 
ACCOUNT OF HIS LAST SICKNESS AND DEATH 291–92 (James Wilson Pierce ed. 
1893) (speech in Skowhegan, Maine, August 29, 1866) (“The theory has been 
maintained by some of the more extreme men of the Republican party that three-
fourths of the States required by the Constitution to ratify the amendment should, 
under present circumstances, properly mean three-fourths of the loyal States, but 
the general, and I think the wiser, conclusion of the party has been to adhere to 
the ratification of three-fourths of all the States in the Union . . .”). 
 223. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (Dec. 21, 1865); id. at 2541 (May 
10, 1866); id. at 2599 (May 15, 1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 501 
(Jan. 16, 1867); id. at 502; id. at 505; id. at 811 (Jan. 28, 1867); id. at 1211 (Feb. 13, 
1867); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (Mar. 11, 1867); LINCOLN COUNTY 
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x Representative George Boutwell of Massachusetts;224 
x Representative Henry P.H. Bromwell of Illinois;225 
x Representative John M. Broomall of Pennsylvania;226 
x Representative Amasa Cobb of Wisconsin;227 
x Representative—and Speaker of the House—Schuyler 
Colfax of Indiana;228 
x Representative Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois;229 
x Representative Henry Winter Davis of Maryland;230 
x Representative Thomas T. Davis of New York;231 
                                                                                                             
HERALD, Jan. 30, 1868, at 2; CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1908 (Mar. 16, 
1868); id. at 1928 (Mar. 17, 1868); id. at 2463 (May 14, 1868). 
 224. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1930 (Mar. 17, 1868) (pressing 
Congress to act under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to relieve disabilities). 
 225. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (Jan. 23, 1866); id. at 919 (Feb. 
19, 1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 615 (Jan. 21, 1867). The press 
missattributed Bromwell’s resolution in favor of a loyal denominator to George 
Boutwell, a member of the Reconstruction committee. See CHARLESTON DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1867, at 1 (“Mr. Boutwell introduced a joint resolution declaring 
the rebel States disqualified from voting pending future Constitutional 
Amendments, until formally restored, and in the meantime three-fourths of the 
represented States are competent to amend the Constitution . . . .”). 
 226. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (Dec. 20, 1865); id. at 469 (Jan. 
27, 1866); id. at 919 (Feb. 19, 1866). While the Thirteenth Amendment was being 
proposed, Broomall left the issue open. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
220 (Jan. 11, 1865). 
 227. CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, May 28, 1868, at 2 (Cobb proposing 
amendment to be effective “upon the ratification of this amendment by three-
fourths of the States represented in Congress”); VERMONT DAILY TRANSCRIPT, 
May 25, 1868, at 2 (same); see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2527 (May 
18, 1868) (Cobb proposing amendment, but without text). 
 228. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1928 (Mar. 17, 1868). 
 229. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 814 (Jan. 28, 1867). Harrison 
misspells “Cullom” as “Collum.” See Harrison, supra note 5, at 413 n.205. 
 230. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (Mar. 22, 1864); BURLINGTON 
FREE PRESS, July 21, 1865, at 4; CLEVELAND LEADER, July 8, 1865, at 2. 
 231. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 155 (Jan. 7, 1865). 
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x Representative Columbus Delano of Ohio;232 
x Representative Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts;233 
x Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois;234 
x Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll of Illinois;235 
x Representative Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island;236 
x Representative George W. Julian of Indiana;237 
x Representative William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania;238 
x Representative William Lawrence of Ohio;239 
x Representative Daniel Morris of New York;240 
x Representative Frederick A. Pike of Maine;241 
x Representative Robert C. Schenck of Ohio;242 
x Representative Glenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania;243 
x Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio;244 
                                                                                                             
 232. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1126 (Feb. 11, 1867). 
 233. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2773 (May 23, 1866). 
 234. Id. at 384 (Jan. 23, 1866). 
 235. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 89 (Feb. 7, 1867). 
 236. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (Jan. 23, 1866). 
 237. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 80 (Jan. 28, 1867). 
 238. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2078 (May 3, 1864); id. at 2080; 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 260 (Jan. 3, 1867); id. at 289 (agreeing with 
Spalding that the South would not resist the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed, 
but would prefer not to be part of the process of enacting it); CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1931 (Mar. 17, 1868) (referring to powers already given to 
Congress under Section 3). 
 239. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 28 (July 20, 1867). 
 240. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2614 (May 31, 1864). 
 241. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 255 (Jan. 3, 1867). 
 242. COLUMBIA, S.C. DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 19, 1866, at 2. 
 243. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 598 (Jan. 19, 1867). 
 244. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (Jan. 8, 1866). 
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x Representative Rufus P. Spalding of Ohio;245  
x Representative John F. Starr of New Jersey;246  
x Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania;247 
x Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin of Pennsylvania;248 
x Governor Marcus L. Ward of New Jersey;249 and 
x the members of the North Carolina Constitutional 
Convention’s Committee on Disabilities.250 
2. Newspapers 
Many Republican newspapers251 developed loyal-denominator arguments 
and spread them to a wider audience: 
x the National Anti-Slavery Standard;252 
                                                                                                             
 245. Id. at 132 (Jan. 5, 1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 224 (Dec. 20, 
1866); id. at 288 (Jan. 5, 1867); id. at 289; id. at 497 (Jan. 16, 1867). 
 246. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 482 (Jan. 28, 1865). 
 247. Id. at 734 (Feb. 10, 1865); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (Dec. 
18, 1865); id. at 1310 (Mar. 10, 1866); id. at 2459 (May 8, 1866); CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 252 (Jan. 3, 1867); id. at 290 (Jan. 5, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 
40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1966 (Mar. 18, 1868); id. at 1967; see also supra note 238 
(Kelley introducing language taken from Stevens). 
 248. The Amendment at the North, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1867; PENNSYLVANIA 
SENATE JOURNAL 17, 18 (Jan. 2, 1867). 
 249. See Veto Message of March 25, 1868, available at https://goo.gl/dWkrbI 
[https://perma.cc/PTM7-63GX], at 3. 
 250. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2413 (May 11, 1868) (asking for 
congressional relief from “the fourteenth article of the Constitution of the United 
States, known as the ‘Howard amendment’”). 
 251. Although this survey of newspapers reveals significant support for a loyal 
denominator, it has been chiefly confined to the newspapers in the Library of 
Congress’s “Chronicling America” (chroniclingamerica.loc.gov (last accessed 
June 26, 2018)) database. Important papers supporting the loyal denominator, like 
the Boston Post, National Anti-Slavery Standard, New York Herald, New York 
Times, and Washington Chronicle are not (yet) in that database, though 
newspapers that frequently quote their editorials are. The New York Times is 
available online at http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/ (last accessed June 
26, 2018) but without page numbers. 
 252. The Constitutional Amendment, National Anti-Slavery Standard (Mar. 
11, 1865), reprinted in AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM JOURNEY IN NEW YORK 
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x the Boston Post;253 
x the Cleveland Daily Leader;254 
x the Emporia News;255 
x the Evening Telegraph;256 
x the Montana Post;257 
x the Nation;258 
x the New York Herald;259 
                                                                                                             
AND RELATED SITES, 1823–1870 259 (Harry Bradshaw Matthews ed., 2008); 1 
THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 
564 (Ann Gordon ed., 1997). 
 253. CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1867, at 2 (explaining Boston Post’s 
views); NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Mar. 11, 1867, at 2 (quoting Boston Post). 
 254. CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, Dec. 13, 1865, at 1; CLEVELAND DAILY 
LEADER, Dec. 21, 1865, at 2. 
 255. EMPORIA NEWS, Dec. 29, 1866, at 2. 
 256. EVENING TEL., Jan. 2, 1867, at 1. Later in 1867, the Telegraph left the issue 
open. EVENING TELEGRAPH, Nov. 7, 1867, at 7. In December 1866, the Telegraph 
noted widespread support for loyal denominatorism among Republicans. See 
EVENING TELEGRAPH, Dec. 28, 1866, at 1. In January 1866, the paper assumed full 
denominatorism. See EVENING TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1, 1866, at 4. 
 257. MONTANA POST, Feb. 29, 1868, at 1. 
 258. 2 NATION 673 (May 28, 1866); id. at 744 (June 12, 1866). 
 259. EVENING TELEGRAPH, Oct. 13, 1866, at 7 (quoting New York Herald); 
DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, Nov. 29, 1866, at 2 (noting Herald’s views); N.Y. 
HERALD, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, December 1, 1866, at 7; N.Y. HERALD, 
Dec. 25, 1866, quoted in STAUNTON SPECTATOR AND GENERAL ADVERTISER, Jan. 
1, 1867, at 1; DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, Dec. 22, 1866, at 2; WESTERN RESERVE 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 26, 1866, at 2; THE DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 10, 1867, at 2; N.Y. 
HERALD EDITORIAL, The Powers and Policy of Congress in Reference to the South, 
quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 15, 1867, at 2; The Work Before the 
Reconstruction Committee—The Right Way to Do It, NEW YORK HERALD 
EDITORIAL, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1, 1867, at 2; Southern Elections 
and Conventions: What is the Duty of Congress?, N.Y. HERALD EDITORIAL, quoted 
in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 1867, at 2. Earlier, however, The Herald took the 
contrary view. See The Next Presidency and the Southern States, quoted in EVENING 
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 1866, at 2; The Constitutional Abolition of Slavery: The First 
Step in the Senate, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 8, 1864 (assuming full denominator 
following passage of Thirteenth Amendment: “And what then? A ratification by 
three-fourths of the States, including in the count the rebellious States”); The 
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x the New York Times;260 
x the Raftsman’s Journal;261 
x the Washington Chronicle;262 and 
x the Western Reserve Chronicle.263 
                                                                                                             
Crowning Event of the War: The Constitutional Abolition of Slavery Throughout 
the United States, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 1, 1865 (looking forward to “the final 
ratification of three-fourths of the thirty-six States belonging to the Union.”). 
However, between these adoptions of full-denominatorism, the paper recognized 
that Article I and Article V rights went together. See KENOWEE COURIER, Jan. 6, 
1866, at 3 (quoting New York Herald). 
 260. Congress and the Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1867; The 
Reconstruction Question in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1867. For reprints of 
the editorials, see, e.g., EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 22, 1867, at 2 (reprinting Jan. 
21 editorial); EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28, 1867, at 2 (reprinting Jan. 28 
editorial). The Times took a contrary position in 1866. See The Constitutional 
Amendment on the Basis of Representation, Feb. 3, 1866 (“[T]he Senate has yet 
to act upon it, and after that, it must receive the ratification of three-fourths of all 
the States. He must be a very sanguine man who believes that this can ever be 
secured.”) (emphasis added); Will the President Stand His Ground?, DAILY 
PHOENIX, Feb. 8, 1866, at 2 (quoting this passage); The South and the 
Constitutional Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1866 (“[I]n a brief period the 
North will be able to impart constitutional validity to the Amendment whether the 
South ratify it or not. Territories now awaiting admission will doubtless be 
invested with the dignity of States in the coming Winter; other States may be 
formed out of States where a demand for division already exists; and by this 
perfectly constitutional process the power of amending the Constitution may be 
secured, despite the inaction or hostility of the South.”). 
 261. RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL, Dec. 5, 1866, at 2; cf. RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL, 
Jan. 30, 1867, at 2 (noting issue raised by Spaulding’s request that the Judiciary 
Committee report on how many ratifications were required). Contrary to the 
paper’s impression, and that of some other papers, see, e.g., DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 
17, 1867, at 3; CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 17, 1867, at 1; STAUNTON 
SPECTATOR, Jan. 22, 1867, at 2. The House never approved Spalding’s resolution; 
Representative Finck objected. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 497 (Jan. 16, 
1867). No Judiciary Committee report was prepared. 
 262. See supra note 245 (Spalding noting that Washington Chronicle editor 
agreed with loyal-denominator theory). 
 263. WESTERN RESERVE CHRONICLE, Jan. 23, 1867, at 2. 
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3. Treatises 
At least seven legal treatises defended loyal denominatorism during 
and after Reconstruction: 
x Joel Prentiss Bishop in 1865;264 
x Orestes Augustus Brownson in 1866;265 
x Timothy Farrar in 1867;266 
x Israel Ward Andrews in 1874;267 
x John Codman Hurd in 1881;268 
x Albert Orville Wright in 1889;269 and 
x John W. Burgess in 1902.270 
George W. Paschal’s treatise left the issue open in 1868.271 
4. Others’ Recognition of Widespread Support 
Andrew Jackson Rogers opposed the Thirteenth Amendment based on 
his assumption that Republicans would only use loyal states to ratify it, as 
                                                                                                             
 264. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 776, 
at 433–34 n.1 (3d ed. 1865); BISHOP, § 776, at 447 n.1 (4th ed. 1868); CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 878 (Jan. 31, 1868) (Sumner quoting Bishop). 
 265. ORESTES AUGUSTUS BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: ITS 
CONSTITUTION, TENDENCIES, AND DESTINY 325 (1866). 
 266. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA § 448, at 401 & n.1 (1867); see id. at ix (introduction written 
in June 1867). 
 267. ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 253–54 (1874). 
 268. JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE, AS 
SHOWN BY THE ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1861 
282 (1881). 
 269. ALBERT ORVILLE WRIGHT, AN EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 249–50 (1889); id. at 284. 
 270. J.W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1866–1876 81 
(1902). 
 271. GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 281 (1868). 
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in they would adopt the loyal-denominator theory of its legitimacy.272 
Later historians have noted that this assumption was widespread.273 
Several opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment acknowledged that loyal 
denominatorism was extremely popular among Republicans: 
x Pennsylvania state senator William Wallace;274 
x former Georgia governor Joseph Brown;275 
x the Baltimore Gazette;276 
x the Daily Phoenix of Columbia, South Carolina;277 
x the Lynchburg News;278 
x the Nashville Daily Union;279 
x the New York Tribune;280 and 
x the Staunton Spectator.281 
5. Agnosticism 
Like Lincoln’s last speech, several Republican sources left the issue open, 
revealing that the full denominator was not fully established in their minds: 
x Senator George Edmunds of Vermont;282 
                                                                                                             
 272. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 151 (Jan. 7, 1865). 
 273. Harold Holzer & Sara Vaughn Gubbard, Introduction, in LINCOLN AND 
FREEDOM: SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 1 (2007 ed.).  
 274. See CLEARFIELD REPUBLICAN, Feb. 14, 1867, at 1 (speech of Wm. A. 
Wallace in the state senate, Jan. 14, 1867). 
 275. KEOWEE COURIER (Pickens Court House, S.C.), Mar. 9, 1867, at 1 (letter 
of Feb. 23, 1867). 
 276. BALTIMORE GAZETTE EDITORIAL, quoted by NEW YORK WORLD, in turn 
quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Nov. 28, 1866, at 2. 
 277. DAILY PHOENIX, June 20, 1866, at 3; DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 11, 1867, at 
2; DAILY PHOENIX, Feb. 5, 1867, at 3; DAILY PHOENIX, Apr. 30, 1868, at 1. 
 278. LYNCHBURG NEWS, quoted in STAUNTON SPECTATOR, May 15, 1866, at 2. 
 279. NASHVILLE DAILY UNION, May 16, 1866, at 1. 
 280. DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 29, 1867, at 2 (quoting New York Tribune). 
 281. STAUNTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 4, 1866, at 2. The Spectator expected the 
Supreme Court to disagree with loyal denominatorism. Id. 
 282. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2662 (May 29, 1868). 
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x Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana;283 
x Senator John Sherman of Ohio;284  
x Representative George Miller of Pennsylvania;285  
x Representative Thomas Williams of Pennsylvania;286 
x Representative Henry Raymond of New York;287 and 
x the National Republican.288 
CONCLUSION 
Several aspects of Reconstruction history are best explained by 
recognizing that three-fourths of the Northern states ratified the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than three-fourths of the entire Union. 
By undermining the legitimacy of Southern governments because of their 
status as “rebel states,” the Reconstruction Act undermined full-
denominator theories of the Thirteenth Amendment and read an implicit 
“non-rebel” condition into “the several States” in Article I. Further, only 
loyal denominator theories recognize that the power to say no to a 
constitutional amendment—that is, to be included in the Article V 
denominator—is among the States’ greatest political power in their 
relations with the federal government. Accordingly, robust reasons 
support the suspension at the time of secession of the denominator power 
and the South’s other federal political privileges. 
Many Republicans, and even a few key Democrats, set out the logic 
of a loyal denominator from the very beginning of the Civil War; this 
analysis of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ legitimacy 
continuously persisted throughout the entirety of the process of 
Reconstruction and beyond. Congress embraced the logic of the Article V 
loyal denominator when it considered its quorum rules and rules for the 
                                                                                                             
 283. Id. at 2629 (May 28, 1868) (noting that unless loyal denominatorism were 
true, condition precedent in Reconstruction Act would not be met at the time 
Arkansas was admitted). 
 284. KEOWEE COURIER, Sept. 7, 1867, at 1 (speech of Senator Sherman at 
Canton, Ohio); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2860 (June 5, 1868). 
 285. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 83 (Jan. 19, 1867); CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1692 (Mar. 5, 1868); id. at 1932 (Mar. 17, 1868); 
id. at 2209 (Mar. 28, 1868). 
 286. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2692 (May 30, 1868). 
 287. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 718 (Jan. 24, 1867); id. at 719. 
 288. NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Sept. 28, 1865, at 2. 
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restoration of rights of representation under Article I, and its rules for 
presidential electors under Article II. No Republicans rebutted the loyal-
denominator theory with any extended explanation in favor of a full 
denominator. 
APPENDIX: LOYAL DENOMINATORISM IN CONTEXT 
1. Expressions of Loyal Denominatorism 
Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2692 (May 30, 1868): 
 [T]he fourteenth amendment is now a part of the Constitution of 
the United States, and I think the Senators on this side of the 
Chamber must so hold. Ten states are more than one fourth of the 
whole number of States; and can it be that ten States can rebel 
against this Government and make an amendment of the 
Constitution necessary, and then have the legal and constitutional 
right to defeat the adoption of the amendment which their treason 
has rendered necessary? . . . The fourteenth amendment has the 
ratifications of three fourths of the loyal States, and that is all the 
thirteenth amendment has. We have declared that the Legislatures 
of these other States which were in rebellion which have ratified 
the thirteenth amendment were not legal Legislatures; and further, 
if by reason of their rebellion the rights of the rebel States were 
not forfeited, this Congress was not a constitutional body having 
the ability by a two-thirds vote to submit either amendment. I do 
not see the argument by which to avoid the conclusion that the 
fourteenth amendment is now a part of the Constitution. 
Senator James Harlan of Iowa, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
1073–74 (Feb. 10, 1868): 
I know it has been insisted here during this discussion by several 
Senators that in their opinion Congress has impliedly recognized 
the legality of these organizations in submitting proposed 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which 
amendments could not become valid as part of the Constitution 
without the affirmation or consent of three fourths of all the States. 
They say that the assent of some of these States was necessary to 
secure this three-fourths vote, and as one of these proposed 
amendments has been declared to be a part of the Constitution, as 
they maintain, in consequence of their affirmation of a part of 
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these provisional States, Congress is concluded . . . . [I]t is clear 
that the Congress of the United States never intended by the 
passage of these concurrent resolutions to declare that these 
organizations called governments, formed irregularly without 
authority of law, had, by the action of Congress, become legal and 
binding. There can now be no doubt on that subject, because 
Congress has since enacted a law declaring in so many words that 
these State governments are illegal and must be considered 
provisional only . . . . 
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
186 (Dec. 19, 1866): 
[W]e saw fit to propose an additional article to the Constitution, 
which upon being ratified by three fourths of the States—of course 
I mean three fourths of the States in the Union and not out of the 
Union—it should become a part of the Constitution of the country. 
Id. at 1365 (Feb. 15, 1867): 
It declares that “when the constitutional amendment proposed as 
article fourteen by the Thirty-Ninth Congress shall have become 
a part of the Constitution of the United States,” &c. That may be 
done, it is very true, without consulting the rebel States; it is 
possible that it may become part of the Constitution without the 
votes of the rebel States; and here suffer me to remark that I do 
believe most sincerely that it is the right of three fourths of the 
loyal States remaining in the Union at any time to amend the 
Constitution, and that such amendment would be valid as an 
amendment, and that it is not necessary in amending the 
Constitution that we should take into the account the votes of the 
rebel States. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2863–64 (June 5, 1868): 
[T]his amendment is already part and parcel of the Constitution, it 
having been ratified by more than three fourths of the States 
recognized as being in the Union and participating in our 
legislation. . . . [W]hen the rebel States passed their ordinances of 
secession, withdrew from all participation in the legislation of 
Congress, formed a new government alien and foreign to the 
Government of the United States, they forfeited and lost all their 
political rights under the Constitution of the United States. They 
could not after that, during the pendency of the war, appeal to the 
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Constitution for any purpose whatever. They had no right to claim 
anything under it. They had no right to set it up for any purpose 
whatever where their own political interests were concerned. . . . 
[I]f the political rights of the rebel States were actually forfeited 
and terminated, or, in other words, if those rights had passed over 
to the conqueror, the United States, and into the hands of this 
Government, then surely they have no right to participate in the 
ratification of the Constitution . . . . [W]hen three fourths of the 
remaining loyal States formally ratified that amendment, it 
became to all intents and purposes part of the Constitution of the 
United States, and is now binding upon us, and upon the rebel 
States. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 987 (Feb. 8, 1869): 
[W]hile the rebel States were, so to speak, de facto out of the 
Union, after they had forfeited their political rights under the 
Constitution, they were at the mercy and subject to the action of 
Congress of the United States. . . . 
Mr. HENDRICKS: Now I understand him to say that it belongs to 
all the loyal States in the aggregate; that the people of the loyal 
States rightfully control it.  
Mr. HOWARD: Three fourths.  
Senator Samuel J. Kirkwood of Iowa, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 1393 (Feb. 15, 1867): 
The belief is entertained, I think, by a majority of this Chamber, 
certainly by myself, that the ratification of the constitutional 
amendment by the due proportion, three fourths of the States 
represented here, will make it a part of the Constitution. 
Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
740 (Feb. 8, 1866): 
I should not doubt . . . that we might secure its adoption by three 
fourths of the loyal States who never seceded, and I believe that 
whenever that question is presented the Supreme Court of the 
United States will determine that a ratification by that number of 
States is a constitutional approval of an amendment so as to make 
it the supreme law of the land. I have no doubt about it. 
Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 2nd 
Sess. 1366 (Feb. 15, 1867): 
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[W]e have the constitutional right and constitutional power to treat 
these States as conquered provinces. I do not doubt that, because 
I believe we have the power to do about as we please with them. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 327 (Jan. 6, 1868): 
Before the Senator takes his seat I should like to ask him if he has 
examined the bearing of our new constitutional amendment on a 
case like this? . . . Does the Senator regard that amendment as 
having been adopted by the requisite constitutional majority? Is 
the ratification of three fourths of the States represented in 
Congress sufficient? 
Id. at 661 (Jan. 21, 1868): 
[W]e have submitted a constitutional amendment, which I 
maintain is now a part of the Constitution, upon a high authority 
and upon as just principles as any part of our legislation or any of 
our acts of authority since the rebellion commenced. I believe I 
can show that the adoption of this constitutional amendment rests 
upon the same exercise of authority, the same theory, that allowed 
us to pass laws after the South seceded; that allowed a portion of 
the States to elect a President of the United States and carry on the 
Government; that allowed us to submit the first constitutional 
amendment abolishing slavery; and allowed us to adopt it. . . . 
[T]he States now represented in Congress have all the authority 
vested in the United States by the Constitution. . . . If any objection 
can be urged against the complete ratification of this constitutional 
amendment, it can be contended with the same plausibility that it 
has not been submitted at all. 
Id. at 662: 
[T]he same principle that allows us to legislate and carry on the 
Government without those States which have broken off their 
practical relations and have no right to be heard allows us to do 
anything that the Constitution permits, and to amend it and perfect 
it as the exigencies of the case demand. We have submitted a 
constitutional amendment; three fourths of the States entitled to 
be heard have ratified it; and I contend that it is a part of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 588 (Feb. 4, 1865) (proposing resolution):  
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[T]he rule followed in ascertaining the two thirds of both Houses 
proposing the amendment to the Constitution should be followed 
in ascertaining the three fourths of the several States ratifying the 
amendment. . . . [A]s in the first case, the two thirds are founded 
on the simple fact of representation in the two Houses, so in the 
second case the three fourths must be founded on the simple fact 
of representation in the Government of the country and the support 
thereof. . . . [A]ny other rule . . . recognizes the power of rebels in 
arms to interpose a veto upon the national Government in one of 
its highest functions. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Dec. 4, 1865) (proposing 
resolution): 
[A]t the time when such [Thirteenth] amendment was submitted 
as well as since, there were sundry States which, by reason of 
rebellion, were without Legislatures, so that, while the submission 
was made in due constitutional form, it was not, as it could not be, 
made to all the States, but to “the Legislatures of the several 
States,” in obedience both to the letter and spirit of the provision 
of the Constitution authorizing amendments, there being a less 
number of Legislatures of States than there were States; . . . since 
the Constitution expressly authorizes amendments to be made, 
any construction thereof which would render the making of 
amendments at times impossible, must violate both its letter and 
its spirit; . . . to require the ratification to be by States without 
Legislatures as well as by “the Legislatures of the States,” in order 
to be pronounced valid, would put it in the power of a long-
continued rebellion to suspend, not only the peace of the nation, 
but its Constitution also; . . . from the terms of the Constitution, 
and the nature of the case, it belongs to the two Houses of 
Congress to determine when such ratification is complete; . . . 
more than three fourths of the Legislatures to which the 
proposition was made have ratified such amendment. . . . [T]he 
amendment abolishing slavery has become, and is, a part of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Id. at 91–92 (Dec. 20, 1865): 
This bill, of course, proceeds on the idea that the [Thirteenth] 
amendment is now a part of the Constitution, to all intents and 
purposes. And who can doubt this conclusion? It has been already 
adopted by “the Legislatures of three fourths of the States,” in 
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other words by three fourths of the States having Legislatures. The 
States having no legislatures at the time of its proposition by 
Congress are not to be counted. Of what value can be the enforced 
consent of the disloyal and barbarous bodies that have pretended 
to act for certain States at the dictation of military power? Military 
power may govern during the war, but it is impotent to make a 
republican State or to give assent to an amendment of the 
Constitution. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (Dec. 4, 1866):  
I shall to-morrow or some subsequent day ask leave to introduce 
resolutions declaring . . . the exclusion of such States with illegal 
governments from representation in Congress, and from voting on 
constitutional amendments. 
Id. at 1396 (Feb. 15, 1867): 
[I]n point of fact only the States actually represented in Congress 
have valid Legislatures; therefore only those States can be 
competent to act on this constitutional amendment. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 1st Sess. 439 (Mar. 29, 1867): 
You have then, sir, another clause of the Constitution which has 
lately found a place there by the votes of three fourths of the loyal 
States, by which it is declared that “no State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States . . . .” 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 453 (Jan. 10, 1868) (proposing 
resolution): 
[A]n amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, and known as article fourteen, has already been adopted 
by the Legislatures of twenty-two States, to wit, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, Tennessee, New Jersey, Vermont, Oregon, New 
York, Ohio, Illinois, West Virginia, Kansas, Nevada, Missouri, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Maine: and whereas it is 
duly provided in the Constitution that an amendment duly 
proposed shall be valid when “ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States;” . . . the amendment to the 
Constitution proposed by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and known 
as article fourteen, having received the requisite ratification, is 
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valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution. 
Id. at 877 (Jan. 31, 1868): 
This amendment was originally proposed by a vote of two thirds 
of Congress, composed of the representatives of the loyal States. 
It has now been ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
loyal States, being the same States which originally proposed it, 
through their representatives in Congress. The States that are 
competent to propose a constitutional amendment are competent 
to adopt it. 
Id. at 1145 (Feb. 13, 1868): 
[T]he amendment has already been adopted by three fourths of the 
States that took part in proposing it, and this is enough. 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
709 (Jan. 23, 1868): 
The constitutional amendments were never, in point of fact, 
submitted by Congress to any of these rebel States. They were 
proposed and submitted to the States of the Union. . . . We had the 
acquiescence of these pretended State governments to it, and it did 
no harm. I am glad we had it. That it was necessary I do not admit. 
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 192 (Dec. 19, 1866): 
The legislatures of thirteen loyal States meet next month, and 
before the 4th of March this constitutional amendment will be 
adopted by three fourths of the States represented in Congress.  
Mr. SUMNER. That is enough.  
Mr. WILSON. I regard that number as enough. 
Representative James M. Ashley of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 140 (Jan. 6, 1865): 
[W]henever three fourths of the States now represented in 
Congress give their consent to this proposition it will become 
legally a part of the national Constitution, unless other States, now 
without civil governments known to the Constitution, establish 
governments such as Congress shall recognize, and such States, 
together with any new States which may be admitted shall be 
represented in Congress before three fourths of the States now 
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represented adopt the proposed amendment; in which event the 
States thus recognized or admitted must be added to the number 
of States now represented in Congress, and the ratification of three 
fourths of the States thus recognized, and none others, is all that 
will be required to adopt this amendment. . . . If we may 
constitutionally pass this amendment by a vote of two thirds of a 
quorum of this House and Senate as now constituted, three fourths 
of the States now represented in Congress may constitutionally 
adopt it, provided they do so before any new States are admitted, 
or before a rebel State government is organized and recognized by 
the joint action of Congress and the Executive. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 119 (Dec. 10, 1867): 
The States which during the war maintained their fidelity to the 
Constitution and the Union constituted the nation, and a 
ratification by three fourths of those States of that [i.e., the 
Thirteenth] amendment made it part of the Constitution. The 
unwarranted “assumption” of the acting President in demanding 
the ratification of that amendment by the illegal State governments 
which he had organized, and Mr. Seward’s “assumption” in 
issuing a proclamation declaring the amendment ratified by the 
votes of said rebel States, undoubtedly could not give validity to 
that amendment after Congress had declared that the governments 
in said States were illegal and constitutional governments. 
Representative Jehu Baker of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. app. 76 (Jan. 17, 1867): 
Such a line of policy as coming from the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania becomes the more strange when we remember that 
it is his opinion, stoutly and often expressed, that it only requires 
three fourths of the loyal States to ratify the amendment—a 
number certain to be obtained. . . . We have proposed, as I have 
stated, an amendment to the Constitution, which few of us 
question will be adopted. Within a very few months it may be a 
part of the Constitution of the United States. 
Representative Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 176 (Feb. 9, 1867): 
There is no recourse for us but to take the plain practical, simple 
method of reconstruction, which does not depend upon the leading 
men of the South or upon any arrangement of a temporary 
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character. It is to reconstruct the political society of the insurgent 
States in such manner as to exclude every element of hostility to 
the existence of the Government. And such a measure is presented 
in the constitutional amendment adopted by this Congress at its 
last session. And in my opinion whenever three fourths of the 
States represented in this Congress shall have ratified it by their 
Legislatures, it will have become a part of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Representative James G. Blaine of Maine, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 1182 (Feb. 12, 1867) (proposed statutory amendment): 
[W]hen the constitutional amendment proposed as article fourteen 
by the Thirty-Ninth Congress shall have become a part of the 
Constitution of the United States by the ratification of three 
fourths of the States now represented in Congress. 
Id.: 
 
[This amendment] specifically declares the doctrine that three 
fourths of the States now represented in Congress have the power 
to adopt the constitutional amendment, and it does not even by 
implication give them to understand that their assent or ratification 
is necessary to its becoming a part of the Constitution. It implies 
that their assent to it is a qualification for themselves; merely an 
evidence both moral and legal of good faith and loyalty on their 
part. We specifically provide against their drawing the slightest 
inference in favor of their being a party in any degree essential to 
the valid ratification of that amendment.  
 
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 124 (Dec. 21, 1865): 
[H]e would be a bold man who would dare to say that after the 
loyal States had maintained the supremacy of their Constitution, 
and more than three fourths of all the loyal States had so amended 
their Constitution, that their action was void without the consent 
of the rebel States . . . . 
Id. at 2541 (May 10, 1866): 
No State lately in insurrection, according to one the measures 
reported, in case it shall become a law of the United States, can 
ever exercise political powers in this Union until the pending 
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constitutional amendment shall first have become a part of the 
Constitution of the United States, by the consent of the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the States now maintaining their 
constitutional relations to the Government . . . . 
Id. at 2599 (May 15, 1866): 
If the measures be finally passed as they now stand, the 
constitutional amendment must be first ratified by the northern 
States or three fourths of the States now represented in Congress 
before any of the insurrectionary States may ratify it, reorganize 
their government, and be admitted to representation. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 2nd Sess. 501 (Jan. 16, 1867): 
[T]his Congress of the United States had full power, without the 
consent and against the consent of every insurrectionary State in 
this land, to propose the pending amendment to all the organized 
States of this Union for ratification. 
Id. at 502: 
[A] Congress that can lawfully legislate can lawfully propose 
amendments, and States that can lawfully elect the Congress can 
lawfully ratify amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
Id. at 505: 
[I]f three fourths of the organized and represented States put this 
amendment into the Constitution of the United States, it will bind 
the insurgent States and give them the benefits of it as well, 
whenever in good faith those States choose to accept it, while, in 
the mean time, it will also bind us and empower us by law to 
secure full and equal protection to all. 
Id. at 811 (Jan. 28, 1867): 
I trust the day is not distant when by solemn act of the Legislatures 
of three fourths of the States of the Union now represented in 
Congress the pending constitutional amendment will become part 
of the supreme law of the land . . . . 
Id. at 1211 (Feb. 13, 1867): 
They [the freedmen] ask that that decree of the people who saved 
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the nation’s life, and which, thank God, by the recorded legislative 
act of twenty represented States of this Union has become a part 
of the supreme law of the land, shall be enforced by act of 
Congress. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 1st Sess. 64 (Mar. 11, 1867): 
To my mind nothing is clearer than that the organized represented 
States of this Union are the Union; and twenty of those States, 
being three fourths of the whole number represented, having 
ratified the amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, that amendment has become part of the 
fundamental law. 
LINCOLN COUNTY HERALD, Jan. 30, 1868, at 2: 
It was in anticipation of this action [by Ohio attempting to rescind 
its Fourteenth Amendment ratification] that Mr. Bingham on the 
same day, introduced in the Federal House of Representatives a 
joint resolution to declare that that amendment had become a part 
of the Constitution by the mere ratification of three-fourths of the 
“loyal States” . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1908 (Mar. 16, 1868): 
[W]e do believe, or at least I believe, that the fourteenth article of 
the amendments having already been ratified by three fourths of 
the organized States of this Union is therefore entitled to by 
proclaimed a part of the Constitution . . . . 
Id. at 1928 (Mar. 17, 1868):  
I believe myself that the amendment is a part of the Constitution. 
Id. at 2463 (May 14, 1868):  
[T]he new grant of power which has come to Congress through 
the fourteenth article of the amendments . . . enables the people in 
Congress assembled to enforce this condition. 
Representative Henry P.H. Bromwell of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 384 (Jan. 23, 1866): 
[T]here fourths of the States which were not in the rebellion are 
sufficient. I do not see how any State which has been in rebellion 
can act on the Constitution. I do not see how a State which has 
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abolished its State government as a part of the United States, and 
has been acting in open hostility to the Government—I do not see 
how such a State can have submitted to its Legislature a 
proposition for ratification. 
Id. at 919 (Feb. 19, 1866) (proposing resolution):  
[Former Confederate states] have no right in conscience to vote 
upon any amendment of the Federal Constitution, or otherwise act 
so as to affect the rights of loyal States, until first restored to full 
power in this Union by Congress; . . . when any amendment shall 
be proposed by Congress and ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the loyal and recognized States, the same shall be taken 
and held thereafter as part of the Constitution of the United States 
for all purposes. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 615 (Jan. 21, 1867) (proposing 
resolution): 
[T]o participate in altering or amending the Constitution of the 
Union can only be done by States of the Union, and is the 
discharge of the highest function possible in a State of the Union-
a function derived wholly from its status in the Union . . . [I]n 
ratifying amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as 
well those now pending as those which may hereafter be proposed 
by Congress, the said several States are not entitled to any vote, 
and are wholly incapable either of accepting or rejecting any such 
amendment, so as to bind thereby the loyal States of the Union, 
until they shall severally be restored to their former relation to the 
Union, in full power and competency as States of the Union, by 
consent of the United States through the Congress thereof. 
Representative John M. Broomall of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (Dec. 20, 1865): (proposing resolution): 
[T]he amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
abolishing slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment 
for crime, having now been ratified by three fourths of the States 
comprising the Government of the United States, to wit, the States 
of Illinois, Rhode Island, Michigan, Maryland, New York, West 
Virginia, Maine, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Missouri, Nevada, Indiana, Minnesota, Vermont, Connecticut, 
and New Hampshire, the same has thereby become the paramount 
law of the land; and the House of Representatives congratulates 
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the country on being at last and forever free. 
Id. at 469 (Jan. 27, 1866): 
It would be curious if we must consult those who have repudiated 
the Constitution whether we shall amend it or not. What have they 
to do with altering a compact who deny being parties to it? 
According to this notion, if these eleven States had held out 
forever, the remaining twenty-five, not being three fourths of the 
thirty-six, never could alter the Constitution. Besides, if the votes 
of these States were needed to ratify the amendment, then there 
was no amendment to ratify. If these States must be counted in the 
ratification they were entitled to a voice in the adoption, and if so, 
the amendment did not pass by the constitutional majority in either 
branch of Congress. If two thirds of the Senators and 
Representatives from the loyal States alone could lawfully adopt 
the amendment, three fourths of the Legislatures of the loyal 
States alone could lawfully ratify it. 
Id. at 919 (Feb. 19, 1866) (proposing resolution):  
[T]he states that did not renounce their allegiance to the Federal 
Government during the late rebellion . . . are the only States clothed 
with legal power to consider and decide upon amendments to that 
Constitution. . . . States which did, by their Legislatures, call 
conventions for the purpose of expressly denying allegiance to the 
Federal Constitution and Government . . . did abrogate all State 
government as States of this Union; and did abdicate all government 
as in and of this Union . . . have no right in conscience to vote upon 
any amendment of the Federal Constitution, or otherwise act so as 
to affect the rights of loyal States, until first restored to full power 
in this Union by Congress . . . . [W]hen any amendment shall be 
proposed by Congress and ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the loyal and recognized States, the same shall be taken 
and held thereafter as part of the Constitution . . . . 
Representative Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, Speaker of the House, CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1928 (Mar. 17, 1868): 
The opinion of the Chair is that the fourteenth article of the 
constitutional amendments has been adopted and is part of the 
Constitution. 
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Representative Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 814 (Jan. 28, 1867): 
The constitutional amendment will be ratified by three fourths of 
the States in their practical relations to the Government. It will 
thus in my judgment become a part of the Constitution. 
Representative Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (Mar. 22, 1864): 
If it be assumed that the basis of calculation shall be three fourths 
of the States now represented in Congress I agree to that 
construction of the Constitution . . . . 
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, July 21, 1865, at 4 (quoting “Henry Winter 
Davis, in his oration at Chicago”): 
[W]hen it shall have received the assent of three-fourths of those 
now recognized as States and represented in Congress, let 
Congress instantly proclaim it as the fundamental law of the land, 
valid and binding as the Constitution itself, of which they will 
have made it a part. 
Representative Thomas T. Davis of New York, CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 155 (Jan. 7, 1865): 
We propose simply to submit to the people of the States the 
proposition to amend the Constitution. It requires the assent of 
three fourths of all the States represented in this Congress. 
Representative Columbus Delano of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 1126 (Feb. 11, 1867): 
Mr. Delano introduced a bill declaring the ratification of the 
fourteenth article of the Constitution of the United States, 
proposed by the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress . . . . 
Representative Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2773 (May 23, 1866): 
The Freedman’s Bureau was a necessity created by military law. 
It was a law before the [Thirteenth] amendment was ratified by 
three fourths of the loyal States.  
Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 384 (Jan. 23, 1866): 
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[T]here fourths of the States which were not in rebellion are 
sufficient. I do not see how a State which has been in the rebellion 
can act on the Constitution.  
Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. app. 89 (Feb. 7, 1867): 
The late rebel States are to all intents and purposes as much 
territories of the United States, subject to the exclusive control of 
Congress, as are the territories of Utah, New Mexico, Montana, or 
any other Territory belonging to the Government.  
Representative Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (Jan. 23, 1866): 
[I]n three fourths of the States that would be required to ratify an 
amendment on this subject, nearly all of them have made the 
suffrage so nearly universal that the distinction is scarcely 
material. 
Representative George W. Julian of Indiana, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. app. 80 (Jan. 28, 1867): 
Congress may . . . leav[e] the amendment to the disposition of the 
loyal States, whose representatives in Congress for nearly six 
years past have ignored the existence of disloyal States in dealing 
with the mighty concerns of war and peace and the amendment of 
the Constitution.  
Representative William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2078 (May 3, 1864): 
I would like to have the bill declare in his [Thaddeus Stevens’s] 
language that “in all proceedings to amend the Constitution of the 
United States none of the States embraced in the southern 
confederacy can be permitted to participate, nor can they be 
counted as among the States necessary to form a constitutional 
majority to adopt said amendments; and that whenever any 
amendments shall be ratified by three fourths of the non-seceding 
States, they shall be taken and adjudged to be a part of the 
Constitution.”  
Id. at 2080: 
The three fourths of the remaining States will unquestionably be 
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held to be adequate to act . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 260 (Jan. 3, 1867): 
[T]he political status of the South cannot be settled until its 
rebellious leaders discover that the loyal people of the country are 
able to defend its institutions against the usurpations of Andrew 
Johnson, accept the constitutional amendments already adopted 
and which are in process of adoption by three fourths of the States 
which now constitute the Union, and submit to Congress 
constitutions republican in form upon which the people shall have 
set the seal of their approval. 
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. app. 28 (July 20, 1867): 
It is not true that Congress called on these States to ratify any 
constitutional amendment. The Secretary of State sent the 
amendment to those States, but their ratification was not 
necessary, since three fourths of the States having legal State 
governments can ratify an amendment.  
Representative Daniel Morris of New York, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2614 (May 31, 1864): 
[T]he revolting states are within the Union so far as fealty and 
obedience are concerned; but as far as having a voice in the 
enactment of laws and amending the Constitution, they are out of 
the Union. Till they are pardoned and restored to favor, they are 
not to be counted among the States of the Union. Wherefore three 
fourths of the now loyal States are competent and they alone are 
to be heard in ratifying any amendment of the Constitution that 
may be proposed.  
Representative Frederick A. Pike of Maine, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 255 (Jan. 3, 1867): 
The amendment was submitted only to the States recognized by 
the Congress as States, and their action alone should govern the 
question of its adoption or rejection. . . . We shall adopt the 
amendment by means of three fourths of the loyal States . . . . 
Representative Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, Columbia, S.C. DAILY 
PHOENIX, Jan. 19, 1866, at 2: 
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Schenck, of Ohio, a leading member of this Congress of the 
dominant party, in his recent speech at his State capitol, insisted 
that this amendment “should be adopted by three-fourths of the 
loyal States before admitting the other States,” and that they, the 
now excluded States, as a condition of restoration, should be 
required to ratify it, “for otherwise,” said he, “they might defeat 
it, and ultimately gain such power as to undo all that has been done 
to prevent a repetition of the late disasters.” 
Representative Glenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 598 (Jan. 19, 1867): 
[I]f sent to them by us it was only to allow them an opportunity to 
prove their loyalty by giving it their assent. . . . [U]nlike the 
Secretary of State, we did not expect that the assent of these 
[former Confederate] communities would fasten this amendment 
upon the country without the concurrence of three fourths of the 
adhering States, nor that their dissent would defeat it if that 
concurrence was had. 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 143 (Jan. 8, 1866): 
Sir, how long may this nation survive with . . . such constitutional 
amendments as would be ratified by rebel legislatures . . . ? . . . 
[A] State in rebellion, and whose government and people are in 
actual hostility to the United States, is not a component part of this 
Union, during the continuance of such rebellion, for the purpose 
of exercising any power . . . . 
Representative Rufus P. Spalding of Ohio, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 132 (Jan. 5, 1866): 
The amendment was fully ratified by three fourths of all the States 
represented in Congress, and acting in harmony with the 
Government, at the time the two-thirds vote was given in that 
body, and no additional sanctions were wanted, as none in fact 
could be given by assemblies of men having no share in the 
governing power of the nation. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 2nd Sess. 224 (Dec. 20, 1866): 
If ratified by three fourths of the States represented in Congress it 
will, in my judgment, become a part of the Constitution. Of this I 
have no reasonable doubt. 
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Id. at 288 (Jan. 5, 1867) (noting his misquotation by the loyal-
denominatorist Washington Chronicle):  
I said expressly that I believed the ratification of that amendment 
by three fourths of the loyal States was sufficient to make it a part 
of the Constitution of the United States. And in that I agreed 
exactly with the editor of the paper upon which I was then 
commenting. 
Id. at 289:  
I would earnestly advise the loyal States, all of the loyal States that 
will do so, to adopt that amendment of the Constitution; and, as I 
said the other day, I would earnestly advise the Legislatures of the 
so-called States of the South to do the same thing, not because 
they make it a part of the Constitution by doing do, but because 
they express their own sense of the utility of the measure and their 
accordance in sentiment with it. 
Id.:  
I was informed not many days ago in the town of Petersburg, 
Virginia . . . by some of the gentleman residents there that they 
wanted this difficulty settled. I said to them, “Here is the 
constitutional amendment and you repudiate it.” They replied, “If 
you can put that constitutional amendment in force without our 
aid then do it and we will submit to it. We do not so much 
complain of the provision itself as that we are called into action to 
vote on it as a part of the Constitution of the United States.” Upon 
the hypothesis that their action on it only goes to show their 
submission to the terms we are trying to impose, they will permit 
the loyal States to make this a part of the Constitution of the 
United States by a three-fourths vote, and then come in a express 
their acceptance of it. 
Id. at 497 (Jan. 16, 1867): 
[The Judiciary Committee should be instructed to] prepare and 
report to this House an opinion in writing respecting the necessity 
of obtaining any further sanction to the constitutional amendment 
than three fourths of the States actually represented in the 
Congress of the United States. 
Representative John F. Starr of New Jersey, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 482 (Jan. 28, 1865): 
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[W]e can never agree . . . that the States in rebellion, while in 
rebellion, must be included in estimating the number of States 
required for approval of amendments to the Constitution; that 
those States that have rebelled, separated themselves from, and 
attempted to destroy this Government, do nevertheless still hold 
within this Government, under the Constitution thereof, a 
controlling power with reference to making amendments thereto; 
and that they, taking up the sword and bidding defiance to the 
Government and its military forces, do at the same time hold such 
rights under and within the Government they are seeking to 
destroy as to prevent the people of the United States, during the 
willful and determined absence of these rebels, and without their 
consent making any change in the Constitution itself. 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 734 (Feb. 10, 1865): 
The constitutional amendment, if finally adopted by three fourths 
of the loyal States, as I have no doubt it will be, will prohibit 
forever the admission of any State into the Union with slavery in 
its constitution. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (Dec. 18, 1865): 
[N]one of the rebel States shall be counted in any of the 
amendments of the Constitution until they are duly admitted into 
the family of States by the law-making power of their conqueror. 
For more than six months the amendment of the Constitution 
abolishing slavery has been ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the States that acted on its passage by Congress, and 
which had Legislatures, or which were States capable of acting, or 
required to act, on the question. 
Id. at 1310 (Mar. 10, 1866):  
[I]n adopting those amendments their [former Confederate 
States’] aid will neither be desired nor permitted, but . . . when 
they enter the Union they will swear allegiance to a Constitution 
to which the consent of their legislatures shall not be asked. 
Id. at 2459 (May 8, 1866) (introducing the Fourteenth Amendment on 
behalf of the Reconstruction Committee):  
Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that 
nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any 
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proposition more stringent than this. I say nineteen, for I utterly 
repudiate and scorn the idea that any State not acting in the Union 
is to be counted on the question of ratification. It is absurd to 
suppose that any more than three fourths of the States that propose 
the amendment are required to make it valid; that States not here 
are to be counted as present. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 252 (Jan. 3, 1867): 
I know of no Republican who does not ridicule what Mr. Seward 
thought a cunning movement, in counting Virginia and other 
outlawed States among those which had adopted the constitutional 
amendment abolishing slavery. 
Id. at 290 (Jan. 5, 1867): 
[W]hen three fourths of the loyal States shall have ratified that 
amendment—and I suppose all on this side of the House agree 
with me—it will become a part of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1966 (Mar. 18, 1868):  
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, however . . . . 
Id. at 1967: 
The fourteenth amendment, now so happily adopted . . . . 
Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin of Pennsylvania, The Amendment at the 
North, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1867: 
One of the points mooted by Governor Curtin should warn the 
Southern States of the fate that is in reserve for them if they 
disregard the warnings of the time. According to Governor Curtin, 
the voice of the excluded States counts as nothing for or against 
the amendment. To render it efficacious the ratification by three-
fourths of the States now represented in Congress is all that is 
necessary. The proposition . . . implies the reduction of the now 
excluded States to something resembling a territorial condition. 
PENNSYLVANIA SENATE JOURNAL 17, 18 (Jan. 2, 1867) (message 
from Governor A.G. Curtin):  
A question has been raised whether the States lately in rebellion, 
and not yet restored to their privileges by Congress, are to be 
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counted on this vote—in other words, whether those who have 
rebelled and been subdued shall be entitled to a potential voice in 
the question of the guarantees to be required of them for future 
obedience to the laws. So monstrous a proposition is, it appears to 
me, not supported by the words or spirit of the Constitution. The 
power to suppress insurrection, includes the power of making 
provision against its breaking out afresh. These States have made 
an unjust war upon our Common Government and their sister 
States, and the power given by the Constitution to make war on 
our part, includes the power to dictate, after our success, the terms 
of peace and restoration. . . . If two-thirds of Congress, as now 
constituted, could lawfully propose those amendments, then three-
fourths of the States, not excluded from representation in 
Congress, form a sufficient majority to effect their lawful 
adoption. It was determined again when Congress, by an almost 
unanimous vote, declared the rebellious States without the right of 
representation in the Electoral College in 1864. 
Governor Marcus L. Ward of New Jersey, Veto Message of March 25, 
1868, available at https://goo.gl/dWkrbI [https://perma.cc/88WB-CVJP], 
at 3: 
This ratification, by three-fourths of the States, must be deemed 
already to have been made, unless the Legislatures shall assume 
to decide that when more than one-fourth of the States have, by 
rebellion and war, withdrawn from their duties and functions as 
States, and rendered constitutional amendments essential to the 
welfare of the nation, such States can by their action, prevent the 
adoption of those amendments, and thus occasion, indirectly and 
partially, the results which rebellion and war waged more openly 
and thoroughly to produce. Of the States that have maintained 
their fidelity to the Union, and their constitutional relations to each 
other and the General Government, more than three-fourths have 
ratified the amendment, and I cannot deem it open to doubt that 
their action is sufficient and conclusive. 
The National Anti-Slavery Standard, The Constitutional Amendment, 
NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Mar. 11, 1865, reprinted in 
HARRY BRADSHAW MATTHEWS ED., AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM 
JOURNEY IN NEW YORK AND RELATED SITES, 1823–1870, at 259 (2008): 
Mr. Sumner is very confident that the Amendment will be held to 
become a part of the Constitution when ratified by three-fourths 
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of the loyal States. 
1 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. 
ANTHONY 564 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997) (letter in National Anti-Slavery 
Standard of Dec. 26, 1865) (letter by Elizabeth Cady Stanton):  
By an amendment of the Constitution, ratified by three-fourths of 
the loyal States, the black man is declared free. 
The Boston Post, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1867, at 2: 
 
[T]he Boston Post . . . sweepingly proceeds to show how Congress can 
declare three-fourths of the States represented to be competent to adopt an 
amendment to the Constitution . . . . 
 
NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Mar. 11, 1867, at 2 (quoting The Boston Post): 
If the constitutional amendment were to be ratified by three-
fourths of the Northern, or represented, States, as Mr. Sumner has 
all along claimed it can be, and should be, then it follows that 
Massachusetts may yet be forced to accept and obey it, although 
she now refuses to accept it for herself. The requisite majority of 
the States could compel us to it, let our protests be as loud as we 
feel like making them. 
CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, Dec. 13, 1865, at 1 (emphasis added): 
In view of the pending Constitutional Amendment abolishing 
slavery, which can only become of binding effect when ratified by 
the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, it is of the greatest 
importance to determine the number of States which are to be 
recognized as in the Union. It seems to us perfectly manifest that 
only those states which are represented in Congress, and are thus 
recognized by that body as having a voice in the national 
government, are to be practically regarded as states in the Union, 
and the ratification of the amendment by the legislatures of three-
fourths of these states is amply sufficient to make it part of the 
constitution. Certainly it would be an anomaly if states which were 
engaged in rebellion against the government could, by their mere 
passive silence, neutralize the votes of the loyal states on a grave 
constitutional question. This would be the result if the other 
interpretation were insisted upon. Should it be held that there are 
now thirty-six states in the Union, the eleven lately rebellious and 
still un-reconstructed States would have as much power to defeat the 
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amendment as if they were in full accord with the government. . . . 
Certainly if these states are not allowed to initiate legislative action 
in Congress, they cannot perfect that action by their state legislatures. 
The vote of two-thirds of the members of Congress from the loyal 
states was sufficient for the passing of the amendment through that 
body, and by a parity of reasoning its ratification by the legislatures 
of three fourths of the loyal states is sufficient for its final adoption. 
Id., Dec. 21, 1865, at 2: 
It will be seen that the Secretary estimates the total number of States 
in the Union at thirty-six, including all the so-called Confederate 
States and excluding Colorado. The number of States enumerated 
as having ratified the amendment is twenty-seven, including 
Virginia, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, South Carolina, 
Alabama, North Carolina, and Georgia. While we believe that the 
amendment has been legally ratified, and rejoice that it has been 
proclaimed a part of the Constitution, we must dissent from this 
reasoning of Mr. Seward. The States above named are not in their 
proper relation to the Union, and their ratification ought not to be 
admitted as legal and binding. The amendment is adopted, but 
without their aid.  
EMPORIA NEWS, Dec. 29, 1866, at 2:  
Mr. Spaulding of Ohio, rated as rather conservative, stated in 
debate, that should the amendment be ratified by three-fourths of 
the states now represented, it would be properly adopted. His 
reputation as a jurist gives weight to his opinion. We cannot see 
why, if the laws passed by a majority of Congress as now 
composed, are legal, a constitutional amendment adopted by them 
would not be equally as valid. 
EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 2, 1867, at 1: 
If two-thirds of Congress, as now constituted, could lawfully 
propose those amendments, then three fourths of the States, not 
excluded from representation in Congress, form a sufficient 
majority to effect their lawful adoption. It was determined again 
by the formal sanction of both the great political parties, when 
Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, declared the rebellious 
States without the right of representation in the Electoral College 
in 1864.  
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MONTANA POST, Feb. 29, 1868, at 1: 
The Legislatures of three-fourths of the entire number of States 
not having ratified the proposed amendment, it has never been 
declared a part of the Constitution, but three-fourths of the States 
now represented in Congress have ratified it. . . . If the position 
maintained by the Union party regarding the non-existence of any 
duly organized and recognized civil State governments within the 
late rebellious States is correct, and we firmly and truly believe it 
is, then, under the fifth article of the Constitution, ratified as the 
amendment is by the requisite number of legislatures in the 
organized States, we believe that it is to all intents and purposes a 
proper part of the Constitution.  
The Nation, 2 NATION 673 (May 28, 1866): 
[I]t only needs to be adopted by Congress to secure the general 
assent of the people, among whom, of course, we do not reckon 
the people of the States that revolted, because we do not hold their 
assent necessary to any constitutional amendment. . . . 
Id. at 744 (June 12, 1866): 
[The proposals of Reconstruction Committee] may now be 
considered certain of adoption by Congress, and almost certain to 
be ratified by three-fourths of the States at present lawfully 
organized.  
EVENING TELEGRAPH, Oct. 13, 1866, at 7 (quoting New York Herald):  
The conditions laid down by Congress have been approved by the 
popular voice—by the people of the Northern States, who have 
the sole power over the question in their hands. 
DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, Nov. 29, 1866, at 2: 
The New York Herald has suddenly become the advocate of the 
idea that there is no need that the South should have a voice in the 
adoption of the pending Constitutional Amendment; that the 
ratification by three-fourths of “the loyal” States is all that is 
absolutely necessary. This idea we shall expect to find favor in the 
eyes of the Radicals. They will argue with considerable 
pertinency, that if the laws enacted by a Congress from which the 
latterly insurgent States are excluded are Constitutional, and thus 
unquestionably valid, then any Constitutional Amendment that 
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may be adopted by three-fourths of the States that are represented 
in this Congress will be equally Constitutional and valid. 
N.Y. HERALD, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 1866, at 7: 
The shortest plan for a speedy and comprehensive settlement . . . 
is the plan of amendment, and its ratification by three fourths of 
the States now constituting the Government of the United States. 
If we admit the right of the excluded States to a voice in the 
ratification, we must admit their right to resume their vacated seats 
in Congress just as they are; and that all the legislation of Congress 
in their absence, since they laid down their arms as a hostile 
Confederacy, is null and void. 
Id., Dec. 25, 1866, quoted in STAUNTON SPECTATOR and GENERAL 
ADVERTISER, Jan. 1, 1867, at 1: 
We may establish the constitutional amendment by three-fourths 
of the loyal States, and then reorganize territorially each of the 
outside States on this basis; but we shall gain little time by this 
plan. . . . After being two or three years out in the cold, or five, ten 
or twenty, reason and common sense may prevail among them, 
and they may come in on the terms of the amendment. 
DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, Dec. 22, 1866, at 2 (quoting New York Herald):  
[I]f the doctrine is not sound that three-fourths of the represented 
States are competent to make the amendment a part of the supreme 
law, it [the Thirteenth Amendment] is void from the fact that a 
number of the Southern States required to make up three-fourths 
of all the States were reduced to the ratification in an irregular way 
and by Federal compulsion on the part of President Johnson, in 
the exercise of the discretion of a conqueror. 
WESTERN RESERVE CHRONICLE, Dec. 26, 1866, at 2: 
The New York Herald has been converted to the position which 
Mr. Stevens took more than two years ago, that three-fourths of 
the loyal States are sufficient for the ratification of the 
Constitutional Amendment. The Rebel States lost all their rights 
in the Union when they seceded. They cannot expect to have a 
controlling voice in the reconstruction of the Government. 
THE DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 10, 1867, at 2 (quoting New York Herald): 
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It is highly probable that before the 4th of next March, the 
constitutional amendment will have been ratified by three-fourths 
of the States now represented in Congress. It will then stand before 
the country as the ultimatum of the North—an ultimatum which, 
accepted or not by Southern legislatures, Congress will not 
hesitate to enforce as part of the Constitution. 
New York Herald, Editorial, The Powers and Policy of Congress in 
Reference to the South, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 15, 1867, at 2:  
[W]ill it be best to insist only upon the rights of Congress to 
prescribe the terms of reconstruction and restoration? This is a 
nice question . . . but it may be settled by recognizing the States 
interested as “States whose functions have been impaired and 
suspended, but not destroyed by their Rebellion,” as viewed by 
President Johnson. Thus, acting upon the sound conclusion that 
the States represented in the general Government are legally the 
United States, Congress has only to declare the pending 
Constitutional amendment part and parcel of the supreme law of 
the land, with its ratification by three-fourths of the adhering 
States, in order to make it binding upon the outside States, with or 
without their consent . . . . 
New York Herald, Editorial, The Work Before the Reconstruction 
Committee—The Right Way to Do It, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, 
Feb. 1, 1867, at 2: 
[W]hile Congress is thus disposing of the stumbling-block now at 
the head of the Executive department, and providing a substitute 
in his place, the ratification of the pending amendment will have 
been consummated by three-fourths of the States constituting now 
the Government of the United States. Leaving out Nebraska and 
Colorado, the whole number of States entitled to a voice upon this 
amendment is twenty-six, of which number twenty is three-
fourths. Already the ratification has been made by Maine, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New York, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Oregon, Nevada, Tennessee, and West Virginia—seventeen 
States. We want only three more, and Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and California can 
surely supply those three within the next thirty days. The duty will 
then devolve upon Congress of proclaiming the amendment part 
and parcel of the Federal Constitution, the supreme law of the 
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land, binding alike upon the inside and outside States and the 
Territories. With this proclamation by law it will become the duty 
of the President, under such an enabling act as Congress may pass, 
on the basis of this amendment, to proceed to the reconstruction 
of the Rebel States . . . . 
New York Herald, Editorial, Southern Elections and Conventions: What is 
the Duty of Congress?, quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 1867, at 
2: 
The required number of the States having ratified the amendment, 
it is even now “valid to all intents and purposes as part of the 
Constitution” . . . [A]s Congress has since rejected as illegal and 
void all of Mr. Johnson’s acts of reconstruction, all these Southern 
ratifications go for nothing, and if the amendment abolishing 
slavery, therefore, is not part of the Constitution by the voice of 
three-fourths of the States adhering to the national Government, 
then slavery is not legally abolished.  
The New York Times, Congress and the Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
1867: 
It is also possible that on a general and by no means irrational 
review of the case, the ratification by three-fourths of the 
represented States may be held to invest the Amendment with 
constitutional validity, and thus to provide the guarantees which 
must precede restoration. 
The Reconstruction Question in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1867:  
The autumn elections were contested and won on the merits of the 
amendment, as the groundwork of restoration; and already the 
Legislatures of eighteen states have ratified it, in every case by 
large majorities, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and California will as 
surely ratify it before the session close; more than completing 
three-fourths of the States which now compose the Government 
of the Union. A plan which is thus indisputably indorsed by the 
people whom the majority in Congress represent, cannot with 
propriety by superseded by other measures. . . . It should now be 
stated, authoritatively, whether the amendment is a failure because 
rejected by the South, or whether it is to be efficacious despite the 
South. . . . Mr. Bingham’s view of the subject . . . harmonizes with 
common sense, and with the unavowed but practically adopted 
theory of the Government during and since the Rebellion. The 
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States which relinquished their share in the Government, and 
which are still excluded from it, can scarcely be said to participate 
in the sovereignty which is implied in a change in the Constitution. 
They were not consulted in the framing of the amendment, and on 
that ground deny its constitutionality; and if their right to govern 
continues forfeited or suspended, their right to say yea or nay to 
the amendment is at best questionable. The prima facie right 
belongs exclusively to the States which formed the Government 
during the Rebellion, which have enacted laws, and which dictate 
terms on which the excluded States shall resume their places in 
the Union. On this hypothesis three-fourths of the represented 
States may render the amendment valid, in perfect consistency 
with admitted facts. The parties who impugn the constitutionality 
of such a proceeding are most likely to be those who deny the 
constitutionality of all laws enacted during the exclusion of the 
South; and their opposition is not entitled to more respect in one 
case than the other. 
The Raftsman’s Journal, RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL, Dec. 5, 1866, at 2: 
The coming question is, Will the affirmative action of three-
fourths of the States represented in Congress be sufficient to 
engraft the amendment to the Constitution? If not, then the 
question—who shall decide the terms of restoration—receives for 
its answer, the States that did their utmost to destroy the Union. 
Common, if not legal sense, admits of no such construction. 
RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL, Jan. 30, 1867, at 2: 
The resolution offered in the House of Representatives by Mr. 
Spaulding of Ohio, instructing the Committee on the Judiciary to 
prepare and report to the House an opinion in writing respecting 
the necessity of obtaining any further sanction to the 
Constitutional Amendment than three-fourths of the States 
actually represented, opens an important question. The report of 
the Committee will be awaited with special interest.  
The Western Reserve Chronicle, WESTERN RESERVE CHRONICLE, Jan. 23, 
1867, at 2: 
The idea, deemed violently radical not long since, that three-
fourths of the States represented in Congress have full legal power 
to ratify an Amendment to the Constitution, seems now to be 
obtaining even in conservative quarters. To us it seems the only 
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safe and consistent theory to venture upon. . . . If then the loyal 
States are the true constituent elements of the General 
Government, they have an unquestionable right to mould and 
establish its fundamental law. Hence it is an act of mere grace to 
ask the late rebellious States to ratify the Amendment. Their 
approval or disapproval amounts to nothing, farther than 
indicating their temper. Their hostility to the Amendment cannot 
kill it, provided three-fourths of the States represented in Congress 
approve it. 
Joel Prentiss Bishop, JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 776, at 433–34 n.1 (3rd ed. 1865): 
Are these [former Confederate] States to be counted in estimating 
the three fourths? . . . Whenever the law submits anything to 
persons or bodies, it submits it to those only having legal power 
to act. . . . [I]n legal construction, the expression “two thirds of 
both houses,” means two thirds of those members who are actually 
in their seats and voting. It does not include members who exist 
only in theory of law, neither does it include actual members who 
are absent from the legislative halls, because only in the legislative 
halls does the law allow them to act. . . . By the same course of 
reasoning . . . when there are States which have no legislatures—
States which . . . are even forbidden by the Constitution to put 
forth any legislative act—and there is a call, in general terms, upon 
“the legislatures of three fourths of the several States,” those 
States which cannot legally respond to the call, to whom, 
therefore, the call cannot be constitutionally addressed—those 
States which have no legislatures, and no power of legislative 
action—are not to be taken into account. 
Orestes Augustus Brownson, ORESTES AUGUSTUS BROWNSON, THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: ITS CONSTITUTION, TENDENCIES, AND DESTINY 
325 (1866): 
What then do the people of the several States that seceded lose by 
secession? They lose, besides incurring, so far as disloyal, the 
pains and penalties of treason, their political rights, or right, as has 
just been said, to be in their own department self-governing 
communities, with the right of representation in Congress and the 
electoral colleges, and to sit in the national convention, or of being 
counted in the ratification of amendments to the constitution . . . . 
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Timothy Farrar, TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 448, at 401 & n.1 (1867): 
The fourteenth amendment . . . is now, 1866, in the process of 
adoption by the State legislatures. [Footnote:] It has since been 
adopted by more than three-fourths of the twenty-seven States, 
now [1867] actually composing, by participating in, the 
government. 
Israel Ward Andrews, ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 253–54 (1874): 
In a time of rebellion, is a ratification of a proposed Amendment 
by the legislatures of three fourths of the loyal States sufficient to 
make the Amendment valid? . . . [T]his question must be answered 
affirmatively. If a State has forfeited her right to participate in the 
ordinary legislation of the nation, if she is deemed unfit, because 
of the disloyalty of her people, to assist in enacting the ordinary 
laws, much less can she claim participation in the higher and more 
sacred work of changing the great organic law of the nation. A 
proposed Amendment to the Constitution is no more dependent 
on the assent of a State holding such relation to the nation, than 
upon that of a Territory. But did not Congress direct the recent 
Amendments to be sent for ratification to the disloyal as well as 
to the loyal States? This was done, it is true; but this does not prove 
that their ratifications were essential to the validity of the 
Amendments. . . . Congress made the ratification of these 
Amendments by those States a condition of their restoration to the 
Union. It was for this reason that the Amendments were sent to 
them, and not because such ratification was essential to their 
validity. They were ratified by three-fourths of the loyal States, 
and would be valid without the assent of any of the others. The 
ratification by the disloyal States was simply . . . an evidence that 
they might be restored with safety to their former condition in the 
Union.  
John Codman Hurd, JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR 
NATIONAL EXISTENCE, AS SHOWN BY THE ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1861 282 (1881) (emphasis added): 
The only basis for the actual reconstruction measures of Congress 
being either the theory of conquest or of State-lapse, those 
measures were an assertion that, within the limits of the ten States 
of the former Confederacy, there was no political people 
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participating in that sovereignty which, as a unit, is held by the 
United States, as recognized by other nations, and which gave to 
the written Constitution the authority of law within those ten 
States, as within every portion of the national domain. As a 
consequence, no one of these States had the capacity to adopt an 
amendment to the Constitution, as a State to be counted in 
estimating the requisite three fourths. Those adopted since the 
close of the war were in fact adopted by the authority of the States 
choosing to continue in that Union in which only they had 
independent political existence. 
Albert Orville Wright, ALBERT ORVILLE WRIGHT, AN EXPOSITION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 249–50 (1889): 
When States are in rebellion, must a proposed amendment be 
ratified by three-fourths of all the States, or by three-fourths of the 
loyal States? By three fourths of the loyal States. It has been 
decided by Congress that rebel States lose their rights as States, 
until restored to the Union by act of Congress. As rebel States have 
lost their rights as States, they need not be counted in making up 
the number of States, three-fourths of which must ratify a 
proposed amendment before it becomes a part of the Constitution. 
It is true that Congress, when reconstructing the seceded States, 
required them to ratify the recent amendments. But this was done 
not for the sake of securing their votes to make the amendment 
valid, but as a guarantee that the seceded States had accepted the 
results of the war in good faith. 
Id. at 284:  
Congress held that rebel States have lost their rights as States, and 
therefore that only three-fourths of the loyal States are needed to 
ratify the amendments. This decision by the only lawful authority 
(for the Supreme Court cannot decide political questions) binds us 
legally, whether it was a right or wrong decision. Three-fourths of 
the States then recognized as in the Union ratified each of these 
amendments, and they are therefore legally a part of the 
Constitution. 
John W. Burgess, JOHN W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 1866-1876 81 (1902): 
The true theory . . . was that held by Mr. Stevens, viz., to consider 
only those “States” which had never attempted secession, those 
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“States” which had never been members of the Southern 
Confederacy, as constituting the “States” of the Union at that 
moment, and all other territory and people subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States as being under the exclusive 
government of the central Government; to amend the Constitution 
by a three-fourths majority of these loyal “States”; and then to 
admit these reconstructed communities as new “States” into the 
Union with its amended Constitution. The amended Constitution 
would then have the same power over them as if the Amendment 
had been ratified by them. In fact, their petition for admission or 
recognition as “States” of the Union with the amended 
Constitution would imply their assent to the Amendment as well 
as to every other part of the Constitution. The more moderate 
Republicans feared that the Southern communities would not feel 
obligated to a Constitution amended in this way. It is difficult to 
see why they should not. The Southern statesmen knew that 
Congress had no power under the Constitution to require of new 
“States” obedience to anything as a condition of their admission 
to the Union, but the Constitution as it was at the moment of their 
admission. 
2. Indications of Widespread Loyal Denominatorism 
George W. Paschal, GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 281 (1868) 
(citing FARRAR): 
There are many persons whose opinions are entitled to respect, 
who maintain that the ratification is complete without the 
concurrence of the non-reconstructed States. 
Harold Holzer, Introduction, in LINCOLN AND FREEDOM: SLAVERY, 
EMANCIPATION, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 1 (Harold Holzer & 
Sara Vaughn Gubbard eds., 2007): 
With the vast bulk of slaveholding territory still in rebellion 
against the Union and considered ineligible to participate in the 
coming ratification process, few observers in Washington doubted 
that the amendment would quickly win the required three-fourths 
of the loyal states. 
Representative Andrew Jackson Rogers of New Jersey, CONG. GLOBE, 
38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 151 (Jan. 7, 1865): 
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[I]t is proposed by this amendment that the States in which slavery 
exists shall have no vote, because they are not in a position to 
exercise the right to vote upon this question. But it is proposed that 
three fourths of the States—States wherein slavery does not exist; 
States which have no interest in that species of property—shall get 
together, and by the action of three fourths of them deprive of their 
property the citizens of the loyal border States . . . . 
Pennsylvania state senator William Wallace, CLEARFIELD REPUBLICAN, 
February 14, 1867, at 1 (speech of William A. Wallace in the Pennsylvania 
Senate, Jan. 14, 1867): 
The language of the proposition, as set forth by Congress in its 
resolution is, that these amendments, when ratified by three-
fourths of the states, shall be valid as a part of the Constitution, 
and by many of those in power it is asserted that three-fourths of 
the States means three-fourths of twenty-six States, thus utterly 
ignoring the existence of ten. 
Former Georgia governor Joseph Brown, KEOWEE COURIER (Pickens 
Court House, S.C.), Mar. 9, 1867, at 1 (letter of Feb. 23, 1867): 
The Radical party is at issue with the President. . . . They have over 
two-thirds in each branch of Congress, and have power to pass any 
measure they please over his veto. . . . They are, in my opinion, also 
a unit in their determination, as soon as three-fourths of the States 
which they call loyal, by which is meant, the States represented in 
Congress, have ratified the constitutional amendment, to declare it 
adopted, and to enforce the reconstruction. This, they have the 
power to do. It is, therefore, a fixed fact that the constitutional 
amendment will be adopted in a very short time. 
The Baltimore Gazette, Editorial, quoted by NEW YORK WORLD, in turn 
quoted in EVENING TELEGRAPH, Nov. 28, 1866, at 2: 
There is a strong tendency in the Republican party to assume the 
bold position that ratification by three-fourths of the “represented” 
States is all that is requisite to engraft amendments on the 
Constitution. 
The Daily Phoenix of Columbia, South Carolina, DAILY PHOENIX, June 
20, 1866, at 3: 
The country will soon be startled by the avowal, on the part of the 
leading radicals in Congress, that it will only require the votes of 
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three-fourths of the States now represented in Congress—that is 
so say, the votes of nineteen States—to ratify the constitutional 
amendment. The radicals have determined to insist upon this, and 
to declare the amendment ratified as soon as nineteen States have 
so voted. 
Id., Jan. 11, 1867, at 2: 
The Herald’s Washington correspondent gives the following as 
the latest reconstruction programme: “It is stated this afternoon, 
upon unquestionable authority, that the leaders of the majority in 
Congress have agreed upon a programme for the present session, 
in so far as the Southern States are concerned, and that it 
embraces, first, the ratification of the constitutional amendment 
by three-fourths of the States represented in Congress; and, 
second, the reorganization of the recusant States by compulsion. 
The adoption of the amendment by the Legislatures will be 
completed, it is expected, by the 1st of February, when measures 
will be immediately carried through in Congress, looking to the 
governing of the South by the military arm. 
Id., Feb. 5, 1867, at 3:  
The delegation of North Carolina Unionists left Washington, for 
their homes, on Monday. The delegation has been there two 
weeks, and concluded, after interviews with the leading 
politicians, that the amendment will be declared ratified when 
three-fourths of the represented States have sanctioned it. 
Id., Apr. 30, 1868, at 1: 
The Republicans of Congress hold that the constitutional 
amendment, upon which they swept the country in the State 
elections of 1866, known as article fourteen, has been duly ratified 
by the necessary three-fourths of the States represented in the 
General Government.  
The Lynchburg News, LYNCHBURG NEWS, quoted in STAUNTON 
SPECTATOR, May 15, 1866, at 2: 
The programme . . . is evident, viz.: to announce the adoption of 
the proposed amendment as soon as it shall have been ratified by 
three-fourths of the States now represented, and to make its 
subsequent ratification by the Southern states an indispensable 
condition of their restoration to the Union, and the admission into 
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Congress of their representatives. 
The Nashville Daily Union, NASHVILLE DAILY UNION, May 16, 1866, at 1: 
This is an important feature . . . in the scheme of the committee. 
Three-fourths of the States now represented in Congress are to be 
deemed sufficient for the ratification of the proposed amendment; 
and its ratification by the other States is to be required only as a 
condition of their restoration to Congress. 
The New York Tribune, DAILY PHOENIX, Jan. 29, 1867, at 2 (quoting NEW 
YORK TRIBUNE):  
There are fourteen States that will not ratify the amendment, and 
it can only be carried over their heads by ignoring them in the 
court, and assuming that three-fourths of the States at present 
represented in Congress will suffice to ratify it. 
The Staunton Spectator, STAUNTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 4, 1866, at 2: 
It is now decided that the requisite three-fourths of all the States 
cannot be induced to adopt the proposed Constitutional 
Amendment. The Radicals will probably assume that it is only 
necessary to have the adoption of three-fourths of the States now 
represented in Congress. 
3. Loyal-Denominator Agnosticism 
Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 2662 (May 29, 1868): 
[I]t is contended by some statesmen and jurists that three fourths 
of the States which must assent to this article of the Constitution 
means three fourths of the States which had legal and loyal and 
represented governments at the time the article was proposed. It is 
contended by another class of statesmen and jurists, whose purity 
is not to be questioned, that the Constitution plainly means that 
three fourths of the States are three fourths of all the States, and, 
therefore, in order to have it become a part of the Constitution, 
you must have twenty-eight States assent to it, instead of nineteen, 
or whatever the number would otherwise be. . . . [T]he inclination 
of my mind is, if it is of value to anybody to know it, in favor of 
the latter proposition. I hold myself ready to change my opinion if 
I shall be convinced, or that inclination if it shall turn out to be 
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wrong. 
Senator John Sherman of Ohio, KEOWEE COURIER, Sept. 7, 1867, at 1 
(speech of Senator Sherman at Canton, Ohio): 
Some members were in favor of limited confiscation of land; some 
in favor of military governments; some in favor of treating the 
amendment as already adopted by three-fourths of the loyal States; 
but neither of these measures met the assent of Congress. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2860 (June 5, 1868): 
Now, it is a matter of dispute whether that amendment has been 
adopted, what number of States is required for its adoption . . . . 
Representative George Miller of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. app. 83 (Jan. 19, 1867): 
It is . . . contended by some able lawyers on this floor that it is not 
necessary to include these ten unrepresented States; and if that 
position is tenable, then but three fourths of the twenty-six States 
would be required, to wit, twenty, and upon that hypothesis we 
have pledged three more States than are sufficient to accomplish 
this desirable object. But, as I stated on a former occasion in this 
Hall in regard to a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, 
it is a question too important to theorize upon, as there is no telling 
what the Supreme Court of the United States, as now or shall 
hereafter be constituted, may decide in regard to the status of these 
ten insurrectionary States . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1692 (Mar. 5, 1868): 
[W]e should wait until these States are reconstructed. . . . Then there 
can be no longer any doubt as to the question of the adoption of the 
fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, if it is not already adopted. It is a mooted question now 
whether that amendment has not been adopted by the ratification of 
three fourths of the loyal States. I know it is contended by some that 
it must be ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of all the 
States in the Union (including those lately in rebellion). 
Id. at 1932 (Mar. 17, 1868): 
If two thirds [sic] of the loyal States is sufficient it has been adopted; 
if not it has not been adopted. In order to prevent any difficulty that 
2018] THE HISTORY OF THE LOYAL DENOMINATOR 145 
 
 
 
might arise on the question I say we ought to insist that three fourths 
of all the States of this Union should ratify it . . . . 
Id. at 2209 (Mar. 28, 1868):  
This amendment being ratified by three fourths of all the States of 
the Union, there can be no question raised as to whether a 
ratification by three fourths of the States that did not claim to have 
seceded would be sufficient . . . . 
Representative Thomas Williams of Pennsylvania, CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2692 (May 30, 1868): 
[T]he doctrine . . . that the fourteenth amendment is not any part 
of the Constitution by virtue of the ratification of three fourths of 
the loyal States [is] a proposition the correctness of which I am 
not now prepared to admit.  
Id. at 3009 (June 10, 1868): 
If it be true that twenty-three States, being more than three fourths 
of the loyal States of the Union, having ratified the constitutional 
amendment, it is now a part of the Constitution, then this clause is 
perfectly constitutional and perfectly proper; but there is doubt 
upon that question; people do differ as to whether or not that has 
taken effect.  
Representative Henry Raymond of New York, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 718 (Jan. 24, 1867): 
If we hold with many that the loyal States alone may amend the 
Constitution, we can find seven States out of the twenty-six, with 
less than a million of population, who can absolutely defeat any 
amendment. 
Id. at 719: 
Those gentlemen . . . maintain that the actual sovereignty of the 
nation rests with those States which never renounced their share 
of it, and that three fourths of those States are as competent to 
ratify constitutional amendments as their representatives are to 
enact laws. My learned friend from Ohio [Mr. Bingham] holds this 
opinion and sustains it with his accustomed ability and eloquence. 
The argument in its support is certainly not without force, and the 
theory is held by some very able writers on constitutional law.  
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National Republican, NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Sept. 28, 1865, at 2 (emphasis 
added): 
Some are of the opinion that the amendment has already been 
legally ratified, as two thirds [sic] of the states not in rebellion 
ratified it, and it is argued that a State which is waging war against 
the Government for its destruction has no right to be consulted 
respecting proposed modifications of the fundamental law. But, 
while these hold that the Constitution may be legally amended by 
three fourths of the States actually and loyally in the Union at the 
time, it is argued by most statesmen that to silence all cavil and set 
aside all doubts, the amendment should be ratified by three fourths 
of all the States. 
 
